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I. INTRODUCTION
Much ink has been shed over the propriety of the use of religious language in
law-making.2 Some commentators have argued that lawmakers can properly be
motivated by religious concerns3 or even that they are inescapable; but that a
1

Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, and Co-editor, JOURNAL OF LAW
Howard Lesnick and Howard Vogel have made this a much better article than
it was going to be, and Pat Keifert and my colleagues on ELCA Church in Society’s Task
Forces, brought together by John Stumme, are responsible for getting me thinking about this
topic. Michael Perry’s work was a significant influence, among others, and I must also thank
Susan DeVos, who did the scut-work well without complaint, aided by Jonathan Miller.

AND RELIGION.

2
See, e.g., Stephen Carter, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 18-101 (1993); Mark Tushnet,
Religion in Politics, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1131 (1989)(book review); Michael J. Perry,
MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 77-104 (1988); Kent Greenawalt, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2
J. LAW & RELIG. 325 (1984); Daniel O Conkle, Differing Religions, Different Politics:
Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10
J.LAW & RELIG. 1, 11-30 (1993-94).
3

Justice Rehnquist, for example, views “individual moral judgments” as an appropriate
“springboard” for political action, but they do not in themselves justify a decision; only when
their followers have become “sufficiently numerous” to pass a law will such moral
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lawmaker may not rely on religious reasons in making a decision.4 John Rawls
considers religious reasons a paradigmatic example of “nonpublic reasons,”5 while
Richard Rorty would want to make it “‘seem bad taste’“ to bring religion into public
discussion.6 Both Michael Perry and Ronald Thiemann have criticized Rawls for
insisting that religious arguments cannot be fully shared by all members of the
polity, and therefore are precluded.7 Thiemann also criticizes Thomas Nagel’s
position that religious arguments cannot be used because religious people are not
prepared to make arguments available so that others can make the same judgment as
they do.8 Others have countered that refusing entry to religious arguments deprivileges them compared to secular arguments, in violation of both speech and free
exercise norms,9 or that religious discourse is so important to public life that it is
incumbent for elected officials not to conceal their religious convictions.10
In its broad sense, this debate over religious argument in public life arises from
what David Hollenbach calls “the fact of pluralism.” As an organic response to “the
diversity of conceptions of the meaning and purpose of life,” pluralism, in
Hollenbach’s view, is likely to be a permanent reality in modern democratic
cultures.11 If he is right, not to acknowledge such a reality, not to give it moral
weight in political decision-making, seems not simply foolish, but also wrong.
justifications carry any legal weight. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705 (1976).
4
For examples of arguments that lead to this or a more radical separatist conclusion see
MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 9-28(1991) (discussing Kent Greenawalt, Bruce
Ackerman, Thomas Nagel, and John Rawls). Some who are most outspoken against religious
language in public life fear a specific antagonist: a conservative Christian, often labeled
“fundamentalist,” who believes that divine revelation hands down a specific set of mandates
about how all people should live. Some of them have expressed concern that lobbyists and
lawmakers—labeled “stealth candidates” in local political races—will hide their religious
motives and plans until they are elected. See, e.g., K. L. Billingsley, ACLU Sues California
School Board, Charges It Muzzles Public Criticism, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at A4
(describing religious conservative candidates for school board); Symposium, INSIGHT MAG.,
May 5, 1997, at 25 (describing Christian Coalition candidates); William Safire, Gambling
Panel’s Foxes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 20, 1997, at B08 (describing gambling
commission candidate who served on the Family Research Council).
5

MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS 54-58 (1997),

6

Id. at 45, quoting Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, 3 COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994).
7

Id. at 54-61; RONALD E. THIEMANN, RELIGION
DEMOCRACY 124-26 (1996).

IN

PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA

FOR

8

Id. at 127-30.

9

RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 32-33.

10

See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 166 (1995);
RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 78 (noting that the Williamsburg Charter drafters called
for public accessibility of private convictions to engage those who do not share such
convictions).
11

David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 879 (1993) (citing and quoting John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987).
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Yet, only a few legal scholars have gone past the propriety debate to work out
what jurisprudence might look like if lawmakers and judges took their religious
world-views seriously—and explicitly—in their work, in a way respectful of “the
fact of pluralism.”12 My task is to imagine the concrete case: what a judge’s
jurisprudence might look like if a judge considered the wisdom of his own religious
tradition in constitutional cases. This article explores broad jurisprudential themes
and specific First Amendment and social welfare opinions of Justice William
Rehnquist, who for some years has been a member of a Lutheran congregation, my
own denomination. While Justice Rehnquist’s views have moderated over the years,
and he has become known, partly through the impeachment inquiry, for a judicious
temperament, I will make a modest case that in his jurisprudence, Justice Rehnquist
does not take seriously central Lutheran understandings. (I should be very clear that,
other than his membership, I know nothing about Justice Rehnquist’s theological
beliefs or religious practice, and I do not consider them.13 I only suggest how a
person who accepts Lutheran doctrine, or one “take” on it, would reason about legal
issues.)14
Justice Rehnquist is somewhat of a foil here, for he is a good example—but far
from the only one—of how a judge from a particular faith-tradition may find himself
not reflecting elements of that tradition in his jurisprudence. For instance, Sanford
Levinson has shown how the American polity has somewhat successfully demanded
that Catholic justices explicitly renounce any notion that their faith will have

12
Most recently, Perry has made the more expansive argument that no reasons that
lobbyists or lawmakers might give as arguments, motivations, or pivotal influences in their
decisions are out of bounds; but that a religious lawmaker may rely on his religious belief as a
ground for decision only if he is convinced that there is a plausible secular reason for his
action as well. RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 43-44. In his previous work, Perry had
made an appeal for politics that were publicly intelligible and accessible, i.e.,”comprehensible
to those who speak a different religious or moral language—to the point of translating one’s
position, to the extent possible, into a shared (‘mediating’) language.” “The virtue of public
accessibility is the habit of trying to defend one’s position in a manner neither sectarian nor
authoritarian.” LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 106. Perry refers to similar arguments from
J. Bryan Hehir and Richard John Neuhaus. RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 78.
13
Nor is the article focussed on Justice Rehnquist’s personal moral character or the way in
which he interacts with others in his professional life. In some biographical sketches,
Rehnquist is described as a warm and compassionate person, intellectually sharp and
courageous, see PETER IRONS, BRENNAN V. REHNQUIST: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION
18 (1994); DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT
32 (1992); DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE OF
AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS 4-5 (1991). In fact, the contrast between reports about
his personal character and the tone of his judicial opinions was precisely a factor which
intrigued me enough to begin this inquiry.
14

I happily invite more theologically educated Lutherans to correct mistakes, though I
believe that the themes I take up are true to and central in the Lutheran understanding. Justice
Rehnquist’s jurisprudence may well reflect some Christian “story,” if not a Lutheran one. For
instance, Sanford Levinson suggests that the remnants of the American Protestant tradition
held by founding communities can be found in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Sanford
Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming
Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1050, 1054 (1990).
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anything to do with their judicial office, particularly their interpretive task.15 And
they are surely not alone.
However, I think that Justice Rehnquist might be a better Justice if he were a
better Lutheran justice. That is, his failure to deploy traditional Lutheran ethics to
understand and speak to the American constitutional situation impoverishes the
center of his own jurisprudence. Even if he reached many of the same decisional
outcomes, his willingness to take Lutheran theological insights about the relationship
between God and humans seriously as he works could lead to a more complex and
accurate jurisprudence. In particular, some of his rhetorical moves would be better
informed by analogical adaptation from Lutheran views of the relationship between
church, state, society, and the individual.
The Lutheran position, which many Lutherans distance from Protestantism,16 is to
be sure often difficult, because it is paradoxical. However, it is precisely those
paradoxes which make this position a powerful tool for gaining insights into the
seemingly contradictory and complex demands of post-modern society, and the
human condition itself.
I realize that such a project is loaded with landmines for both theology and law—
ranging from the central question theistic believers must ask, “is it possible to take
God out of the picture, even analogically?” to the question people with other beliefs
about religion might ask, namely, “what hidden theological assumptions might we

15
Levinson, supra note 14 at 1062-65. Justice Brennan was required to answer the
question, “‘[W]ould you be able to follow the requirements of your oath [to follow the laws
and precedents of this Nation] or would you be bound by your religions obligations?’“ Id. at
1062 (quoting Nomination of William Joseph Brennan: Hearings Before the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1957) [hereinafter Brennan
Hearings]). He responded, “‘I say not that I recognize that there is any obligation superior to
that [oath], rather that there isn’t any obligation of our faith superior to that.’“ Id. at 1063
(quoting Brennan Hearings, 34). Justice Scalia was required to answer what he might do about
a deeply held “‘personal moral conviction, which may be pertinent to a matter before the
Court,’“ and he responded that he had a moral obligation “‘to be bound by the determinations
of that democratic society’“ and “‘[i]f [the judge] feels that he cannot be, then he should not be
sitting as a judge.’“ Id. at 1064 (quoting Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 43 (1986)
[hereinafter Scalia Hearings]). Even faced with clearly immoral laws, Judge Scalia
responded, “‘[i]n no way would I let that influence my determination of how they apply.’“ Id.
(quoting Scalia Hearings, 43). Justice Anthony Kennedy, responding to a question about an
admiring remark he had made as “‘a practicing Catholic’“ to Sen. Jesse Helms’ views on
abortion, stated, “‘Now it would be highly improper for a judge to allow his or her own
personal or religious views to enter into a decision respecting a constitutional matter.’“ Id. at
1064-65 (quoting The Questions Begin: “Who is Anthony Kennedy,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1987, at B16).
16

Historian Sydney Ahlstrom recognizes four “traditional” headings for American
churches which arose out of the Reformation: Lutheran, Anglican, Reformed, and Radical.
SYDNEY AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 72 (1972). Some
moments in American Lutheranism have emphasized Lutheranism as conserving the best of
the Catholic tradition against radical and Reformed movements, while others have attempted
to marry Lutheranism with other Protestant traditions into an “American Lutheranism.” Id. at
518-26.
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mistakenly import as we are trying to adapt a theological idea to a secular setting?”17
While Michael Perry and others have taken questions of this nature quite seriously,
particularly the need for respectful process,18 I will first suggest two moves that
might respond to legitimate concerns about religious influence in the judicial
process.
II. WHEN MIGHT A RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT HELP?
Taking as true Perry’s position that some plausible secular argument must be
advanced to justify every political decision, we might ask why a judge’s ability to
borrow from his religion might make a difference in his opinions. First, a judge’s
religious understandings may usefully inform the rhetorical elements of his opinion,
even if it is more problematic to permit such understandings to ground the decisional
elements of the case. Second, joining Perry19 and Ron Thiemann20 in viewing
religious traditions as in part preserving a storehouse of wisdom on the human
experience, I argue that we can borrow analogically even in a state committed to a
secularly justified result.
A. Rhetorical Elements of Judicial Decision-Making
Even if Perry is right that a court must justify its decision using secular
arguments, a judge’s religious views may usefully inform the way in which she
constructs the rhetorical cast,21 and particularly the forensic and epideictic elements22
of her opinion. To be adequate to its authority, the Supreme Court must move
beyond decisional compromise23 in individual opinions, and even beyond a laudable
concern for justificatory consistency24 over time. To be publicly persuasive in
17
See, e.g., Stephen D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV.
583, 604 (1993) (taking up the question whether moral arguments in law make sense without a
transcendent source or “superlative,” without God).
18

See, e.g., RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5 at 99-101, 105-11, 125-26 (1991).

19

LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 70-75.

20

THIEMANN, supra note 7, at 132.

21

Aristotle defined rhetoric as the “faculty which apprehends the possible means of
persuasion in any given case” or subject. ARISTOTLE, SELECTED WORKS 611, section 1356a
(Hippocrates G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson, eds., Peripatetic Press, 2d ed. 1986)(hereinafter
cited as Aristotle, at page and section.)
22

See notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text (further explicating the forensic and
epideictic elements of rhetoric.)
23
Any number of opinions display the results of rhetorical compromise; they speak in a
multiplicity of rhetorical tongues, reflecting the arguments of each of the Justices whose vote
was needed to reach the decision. One oft-cited example of rhetorical compromise is Justice
Brennan’s opinion in Plyler v. Doe, which borrows from illegitimacy, alienage, and education
jurisprudence to justify invalidation of a state education exclusion for illegal alien children.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
24
Some justices do seem to take pains to display some (if not perfect) theoretical
consistency over time on issues such as the relationship of the federal and state governments,
judicial review, the presumption of constitutionality, and similar issues. Yet, these patterns
often assert themselves in concurring or dissenting opinions, rather than the opinion of the
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history, the Court will need to take more care for both the forensic function of its
opinions, that layer of argument aimed at convincing the reader that a litigant (or
lower court) has acted wrongfully or correctly under the law,25 and the epideictic,
which is the rhetorical “piece” of an argument that praises or blames one of the
parties for what has happened. If it does not carefully construct these elements of its
argument, the Court can be sure that the public will imply or supply a forensic and
epideictic text, even if not the one intended by the Justices.26
Viewing cases over time, it is not clear that the Supreme Court consciously
attends to the forensic or epideictic functions that the Court’s opinions serve, perhaps
because the court is still mired in a 19th century conception of law as science.27 In
the scientific model, the speaker is simply a detached observer, not persuading the
hearer of the moral strength of his position, but instead finding a cold, hard legal
truth out in nature, much like isolating an insect in an entomological expedition. In
the scientific model, the hearer becomes unimportant, almost unnoticed; and the
speaker cannot “see” the facts through a particular character or lens, lest he destroy
the objectivity of the search for truth. A judge committed to the scientific model of
law would not want to acknowledge that he has personal views, much less religious
views, for that might skew the “reality” of the legal investigation. Moreover, to
acknowledge that he is writing for, say, a public in turmoil over slavery or abortion
would be to suggest that his rhetoric was aimed at appeasement rather than the pure
truth.
A rhetorical jurisprudential model, by contrast, understands both the reluctant
authority and the invitational force of the constitutional opinion. Such a model
recognizes that the Court must decide even those critical matters on which people are
sharply divided, matters which could easily go one way or another under the
Court, which would presumably have the greatest opportunity for rhetorical influence since it
is strengthened by the judgment itself.
25

Aristotle distinguished between deliberative and forensic rhetoric. Deliberative speech
urges people either to do or not do something; lawyers use deliberative speech in this sense,
while judges rarely do, except when speaking from the bench. Forensic speech attacks or
defends actions done in the past. Forensic rhetoric, chiefly employed by litigants, aims to
prove some action just or unjust. ARISTOTLE, supra note 21 at 616, § 1358b. In a judicial
opinion, forensic rhetoric is used to justify the decision to the reader, but it often waxes far
beyond justification of the decision.
26

Consider two examples:
—the popular interpretation of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as a case which decides
the abortion question on the basis of whether a fetus is a human life;
—in the affirmative action arena, the public focus on “third-party innocence”, i.e., whether
an affirmative action program will harm innocent non-minority employees/applicants, as a test
of its moral worth derived from cases such as Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
In each such case, the public is in some senses correct that this “kernel” of the abortion
and affirmative action cases is necessary to the moral resolution of the case; but it is the public
that has selected that kernel of the Court’s opinion to focus in on the moral debate, with the
other kernels of the argument receiving much less attention in public discussion.
27
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first Harvard Law School dean, is credited with the
development of the “law as science” theory. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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Constitution, because someone must decide. On the other hand, in the rhetorical
model, the Court decides not as a tyrant, foreclosing all possibilities for action on an
issue such as abortion, but as a conversation partner, precluding some choices
because of overriding constitutional values but opening up many more.
The Court’s moral authority to exercise leadership in a national conversation
about distinctive aspects and limitations of American legal justice is blunted in
absence of deliberate rhetorical design.28 If any evidence is needed, one has only to
look at the popular view that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade29 was a
“conversation-stopper” instead of a conversation-starter.30 A more thoughtful,
nuanced rhetorical strategy in Roe and subsequent abortion cases might, for instance,
fruitfully have refocussed public attention on harms and hardships rather than
autonomy and rights. Reframed to the public as tragic situations, these cases might
possibly have engendered compassionate public responses for both mothers and
fetuses, rather than the expenditure of vast energies in the battle to challenge or
defend autonomy rights.
Especially because Supreme Court opinions have become more accessible to the
general public through increased press coverage and Internet access, the Court’s
inattention to the rhetorical aspect of its role is a lost opportunity to create consensus,
not just around outcomes but also around principles of justice. A different
imagination about the Court’s speech—one that acknowledges the particular
character and role of both speaker and its many audiences—not only opens the
possibility of dialectical encounter among legally trained advocates of diverse worldviews. It also bespeaks hope for the possibility that the average person can
participate positively in critical national debates, not simply respond either in
passivity or resistance to a loss in the Court.
Moreover, to ignore the most critical rhetorical fact—that the Court’s audience is
(at least primarily) the American public—is to invite a grave misstep; for it is the
peculiarly American construction of notions like freedom, equality and limited
government that gives a Court opinion its full force. To be sure, a rhetorical
imagination often makes things theoretically messier: for instance, the Court could
have ignored its Free Exercise and Establishment Clause audience, both nonreligious and religiously diverse in a historically specific way, and achieved a less
tortured First Amendment jurisprudence. But that trail of opinions would also be
less authentic, for words like “coercion” and “wall of separation” take on their real
meaning only in the context of a people formed in part from religious persecution
and dedicated to a certain equality of religious belief.
The Supreme Court particularly neglects the epideictic function of its work, the
way in which it implicitly makes judgments about the moral virtue or vice of those
28

Of course, Justice Rehnquist’s more cynical view that rhetorical arguments may be used
to “play to the crowd” as political messages might also explain his failure to use them. See
SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 297 (describing Rehnquist’s view of Blackmun’s
concurring/dissenting opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490, 537
(1989)).
29

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

30

Cf., Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 476 (1996) (“Because
God’s commands need not be rational, logical, or consistent, the response that abortion is
contrary to God’s will is essentially a conversation stopper.”).
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who are before it.31 While one can find the rare exception—e.g., implied disgust at a
hateful speaker32—more often the Court neglects to blame—or indeed to praise.
These epideictic signals may be especially important when a constitutional result
may seem distasteful, for instance, when the Court’s epideictic rhetoric would send a
clear message of support to those harmed by protected speech. For example, the
Court fails to take advantage of an opinion’s epideictic power in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,33 offering the modern test for identifying inciting speech. As the opinions
describe the Klan rally without any significant expression of disgust at Klan
members for their slurs against black people and Jews, the Court almost bloodlessly
sends only one message—that this speech must be protected—instead of taking the
opportunity to speak also to those harmed by the Klan’s deplorable message.
If the Court avoids these opportunities to influence popular opinion about the
morality of a practice beyond the confines of a particular case, the Court deludes
itself about its own power. More importantly, the Court’s silence on the morally
problematical behavior of a litigant, whether it is a state or an individual, may over
time leave an impression on the public about how they should view litigants in a
particular class of cases. The affirmative action cases afford a good example: if the
Court implicitly paints white challengers as maligned good guys out to get their
due,34 and by implication, affirmative action recipients as unworthy and selfish
recipients of a legal windfall,35 the Court influences many more social relationships
than the decision itself affects.
A thoughtful observer of judicial review might, however, argue that Justices
should not wax profound on either the epideictic or the forensic in their opinions, and
certainly should not allow religious beliefs to influence these aspects of their
opinions. Such an observer might claim that a judge exercises a narrow function in
the scheme of justice, and any such comments are gratuitous and unnecessary to
decide the case.36 Of course, most justificatory arguments would also be superfluous
under this rationale, since only one justificatory argument is necessary for each
decision, yet judges often attempt to tie up as many justificatory loose ends as they
can. Moreover, this concern seems more appropriately directed against a trial judge
31
Epideictic or oratorical speech “praises or blames” people or “the existing state of
affairs,” “aiming at what is noble or disgraceful.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, at 616, § 1358b.
Aristotle’s example of epideictic speech is those speeches praising Achilles for helping
Patroclus even though he faced death, while saving his life would have been more expedient.
Id. at 615-16.
32

See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, MN, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1990)(stating that
crossburning in someone’s front yard is “reprehensible”).
33

395 U.S. 444 (1969).

34

See, e.g., Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 n.34, 298 (1978).

35

See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 489, 495-96, 499 (1978);
Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of the Civil Rights
Struggle, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1022 (1994).
36

Howard Lesnick would also have us ask whether any Justice, or anyone else, actually
lives by the religious argument he makes, or whether religious-type arguments are usually
prompted by other gratuitous comments with which the objector disagrees. Letter and notes
from Howard Lesnick, May 1997 (on file with author).
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whose role is to decide particular cases, not against the Supreme Court which
exercises a national governance role. For even if one can contest whether the
Supreme Court was truly meant to be a governance institution, in modern times it has
functioned as an equal partner in democratic governance. For the Court to exercise
its existing role blind to its own actual power would not seem justified.
A more important argument, also raised against religious debate in politics, is
that religion can exercise a corrosive influence on the judicial process, from
divisiveness to disrespect for minority religions. However, the same responses to the
challenges against religion in politics also apply to the use of religious sources
judicial opinions: (a) although religion is sectarian and divisive, it is not peculiarly
so, for many so-called “secular” arguments are also sectarian and divisive; (b)
although some religious people cannot achieve critical distance on their beliefs
necessary for a pluralistic, “ecumenical” conversation, many can, and conversely
many secularists cannot; and (c) although religious arguments can be “subjective,”
they are no more so, and often less so (since they rely on a historical tradition) than
many secular arguments.37 Indeed, there have been strong challenges even to the
assumption that the use of religious language necessarily implies disrespect for
minority religions.38
In fact, while there is reason to be more concerned about these issues in judicial
than political choice, precisely because we imagine the courts to be the reserve of
impartial, “objective” judgment, there is also reason to think that judges will exercise
more self-restraint in using religious arguments. First, as the Catholic judges’
experiences point out, judges come with a built-in bias about letting their personal
views cloud their judgment. Second, constitutional judges themselves define the
parameters of the inappropriate use of religion by government—they are the ones
who have determined it inappropriate for government to impede religious practices
based on views of the value of a religion, its truthfulness, efficaciousness or its
American “authenticity.”39 If the judges have developed these standards, we may
expect enough investment in their validity to assume that judges will apply them to
each other (i.e., on appeal and in concurring/dissenting opinions), if not to
themselves. Third, unlike legislators, judges work in an atmosphere where thorough
testing of biases and ideas by litigants and other judges is part of the norm, not the
exception. Though these constraints do not make the problem of applying religious
insights worry free, neither do they counsel for full exclusion of those insights in the
judge’s work in deciding a case.
A different argument, lodged against a complex rhetorical approach itself, is one
of competence: judges are not qualified to exercise leadership on forensic or even
epideictic questions such as who is morally blameworthy for the particular mess
before the courts. In this respect, critics are sometimes, perhaps even often, on solid

37

See RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 47-48. See also Howard J. Vogel, The
Judicial Oath and the American Creed: Comments on Sanford Levinson’s The Confrontation
of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107,
1113 (1990).
38

RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 51-54.

39

Id. at 14-15.
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ground.40 However, even if we would accept generally that the judiciary is no more,
and perhaps even less, competent to make moral judgments on the actions of
individuals and state because of its peculiar elite vantage point, judges are surely
entitled to do so in three circumstances:
1. Where a litigant has engaged in what an overwhelming consensus
would agree is morally repugnant behavior, especially as it violates key
constitutional principles such as equal respect and liberty, the Court
should be as entitled to speak truth about such matters as anyone. Thus, if
a state deliberately neglects a dying prisoner, or a Klansman burns a cross
on someone’s front yard, or a social worker stands by while a child is
abused, the Court’s failure to speak epideictically signals to members of
the public that they are similarly excused from the duty of denouncing
such action.
2. Where the Court exercises particular competence on a matter, the
Court’s expertise should give it warrant for forensic and epideictic speech.
For instance, values of liberty, due process, even equal treatment, are
matters in which constitutional courts do have more experience and have
given more thought than the average person. Just as we would expect a
bioethics expert to share what she knows about death and dying, we
should expect the Court to speak about the harms to certain values that we
hold dear, even if it decides that the Constitution requires the Court to
prefer other values to those. Traditionally, the outcry against the loss of
such values has been given to the dissenting opinion to raise, but the
Court’s role as an institution that will speak even painful truth is at least
tarnished if the majority will not also exercise this function.
3. The way in which the Court describes the persons who come before the
Court can, over time, send a message that they are to be praised or
blamed, even if the Court does not explicitly use evaluative language to
do so. Such a message over time, particularly as repeated in the opinions
of particular Justices, is almost a foregone conclusion. For, as David
Tracy writes, “[e]very discourse expresses conscious and unconscious
ideologies, whether the someone who speaks or writes is aware of them or
not.”41
Thus, if the state is regularly referred to in disapproving or distrustful
terms, or religious claimants are implicitly described as potential
freeloaders out to defraud the government by making religious claims for
exemptions, over time the Supreme Court will have sent an epideictic
message that may well be unjustified by any set of facts before the Court.
Because these unspoken epideictic choices of the Court may even carry
some weight decisionally—in the religious exemption case, for instance,

40
In respect to questions of religious truth, of course, they share their competence with
other branches of government. See RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 19 (quoting James
Madison’s view that “religion is wholly exempt from [civil society’s] competence”).
41

DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 61 (1987).
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creating a “sincerity” criterion that many unorthodox Free Exercise
claimants must meet as their part of the burden—it is particularly
important for the Court to be deliberate, over time, about how such groups
are described and evaluated through judicial language. In keeping with
their responsibilities to the truth, judges need to describe with complexity
the facts and the characters before them—the good and the bad in each
person or institution which confronts them. And it is important than the
Court’s epideictic views not be hidden, or if they are unintentionally
hidden, for constitutional critics to expose “the hidden, even repressed,
social and historical ideologies in all texts, in all language as discourse,
and, above all, in all interpretations.”42
In some ways, it is only realistic to expect that religious belief will inform the
epideictic, if not the forensic, aspects of a judge’s opinion. As Perry, Greenawalt
and others have argued,43 individual lawmakers’ attempts to hide what is particular
about their commitments may be an illusory quest. If they are indeed formed in a
religious tradition, these aspects of their insight into the world, and their biases on
matters of principle and policy, may be impossible to eliminate from their framing of
a response. And it is perhaps only a matter of fairness that a constitutional reader be
enabled to spot a religious argument when it appears in another guise.
Borrowing from a religious tradition can give depth, and possibly even bring
authority and competence to the Court’s epideictic and forensic arguments that
merely personal insight cannot give. Judicial critics sometimes refer to a judge’s
religiously informed construction of the social landscape as tantamount to his
personal taste about some issues. While one may find judges so ignorant of their
own traditions and communities that religion really is a matter of their taste, the
rigorous interpretation of a religious tradition is surely more “objective” than the
judge’s personal feelings or views.
Religious traditions, at least most of them, have much in common with the
political tradition from which we derive the meanings of our most precious values.
By and large, the moral understanding of religious traditions is formed in
community, often around interpretation of ancient and concrete texts and rituals; it
has stood the test of time; and it has had the opportunity to change and be changed
by the concrete problems of the culture(s) around it.44 As just one example, the
Lutheran understanding of the relationship of church and state has had to speak to,
withstand, and be forged in the fires of such diverse historical movements as the
Peasants’ War, Scandinavian nationalism, the English Reformation, the Holocaust,
and the Namibian struggle for freedom.
Religious traditions offer a treasure trove for forming and substantiating
epideictic judgments in a way that does not sound in personal moralizing. Many

42

Id.

43
Religious reasons may be both hard to uncover, and their impact hard to gauge compared
to the importance of secular arguments, by the legislator himself or a reviewing judge.
RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 34.
44
See RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 80-81; THIEMANN, supra note 7, at 132
(“[religious convictions] are present ‘in, with and under’ the myths, narratives, rituals, and
doctrines of a community”).
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traditions offer narratives, sometimes wry, often complex, to describe the ways in
which a civilization is formed, including the ways in which virtuous people are
expected to behave, and vice is unmasked.45 Some, such as Judaism, Catholicism,
and Islam, have extensive legal and ethical casuistries to draw from;46 some traditions
have brilliant theological and philosophical thinkers and complex treatises.47
Together, these traditions contain millennia of human wisdom, some of which is
“substantially nonrevelational and even nontheological,” can be “presented in public
discussions in ways that do not presume assent to them on the specific premises of a
faith grounded in revelation,” and “can enhance and qualify rationality with
community experience, intuition, attention to symbol, ritual and narrative.”48
While religious language in the Court’s forensic and epideictic functions is
clearly problematical—one has no farther to look than Justice Stone’s famous
dictum, “this is a Christian nation,”49 to understand its potentially destructive role—
the same rules which apply to any of the Court’s justificatory language can also be
applied to religiously informed rhetoric, ruling Justice Stone’s comment and others
like it out of order. For instance, our expectation that the Court should not
rhetorically exclude vast portions of the populace from its audience, by implying that
they do not “count” as citizens, can be applied to religiously informed as well as to
secular argument that excludes them.50 Similarly, just as a court may use a wide
range of philosophical/policy arguments to demonstrate consensus on some issue

45
TRACY, supra note 41 at 12-14. As examples of epideictic stories from widely varying
traditions, e.g., ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER, THE COLLECTED STORIES (Farrar, Straus & Giroux,
eds. 1982); AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS (Richard Erdos & Alfonso Orth eds.,
1984).
46

The great legal schools of Islam offer a wealth of perspectives on morality and law, see,
e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 J. INT’L
LAW 1, 4-10 (1992); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in Liberal
Democracies, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1525 (1996)(passim). Protestantism, while it has not
developed a body of “Christian law,” boasts numerous denominational church statements on
moral issues and monographs by thoughtful theologians. See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America, The Church in Society: A Lutheran Perspective (September 4, 1991);
Lutheran Church in America, Social Statement: The Church and Social Welfare (June 19-27,
1968)
47

Those traditions with extensive legal traditions also can draw on the insights of ethicists
from Thomas Aquinas to Charles Curran, Maimonides to Emmanuel Levinas. For examples
of such insights within the Protestant tradition, see KARL BARTH, ETHICS (Dietrich Braun ed.,
Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., The Seabury Press 1981) (originally published in two volume
edition as ETHIK I 1928 (Theologischer Verlag Zurich 1973) and ETHIK II 1928/1929
(Theologischer Verlag Zurich 1978)); STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER
(1981); H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963); PAUL RAMSEY, BASIC
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1950); JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (1972); GLENN
TINDER, THE POLITICAL MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY (1989).
48

RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 81, quoting in part Martin Marty, When My Virtue
Doesn’t Match Your Virtue, 105 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1094, 1096 (1988).
49

Rector, et al., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).

50

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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before it, it may also take into account a consensus among religious traditions
without adopting a sectarian (e.g., Jewish or Calvinist) position on some question.51
B. Analogical Reasoning as a Legitimate Method of Reasoning from Religious to
Constitutional Traditions
If we accept the usefulness of religious tradition for framing forensic and
epideictic aspects of judicial opinions, we must still ask how such traditions may be
borrowed. Modern legal scholarship has been slow to recognize the use of analogy
to import religious insights about human behavior, the construction of human
community, and other areas of mutual concern to both the disciplines of law and
religion. Perhaps the most direct analogical adaptations have occurred in legal and
ethical interpretation. Professor Levinson, for instance, borrows from the “essential
tensions” between “Protestant” and “Catholic” in Western thought to help us
understand Americans’ varying commitments to, and interpretations of, the U.S.
Constitution.52 Professor Perry has mined a history of interreligious dialogue to
describe an “ecumenical” politics,53 and has compared judicial review to the
prophetic tradition.54 Yet other work has richly profited from these religious insights,
if not always directly by analogy.55 For instance, Thomas Shaffer explicitly uses
theology to frame the ethics of a Christian lawyer;56 while Milner Ball has borrowed
biblical metaphors, and indeed whole narratives, to understand substantive law as
well as the lawyer’s task.57 Some writers publishing in law reviews have recently
been using religious argument in a more directly deductive way, using the theologies
of Karl Rahner or Paul Ramsey, for instance, to construct a theological critique of

51

Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (illustrating how the “common law” of
religious traditions can be instructive, used in the court’s forensic and epideictic functions).
52

See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-53 (1988). Thomas Grey, Joseph
Vining and Michael Perry explore similar themes. Smith, supra note 17 at 585-86. Some, like
Stephen Smith, are conversely criticizing the use of the theological language of ultimate
concern in discussing legal interpretation. Id.
53

LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 83-127.

54

MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 2, at 136-45; Smith, supra note 17, at 585.

55

For instance, a number of scholars are working to uncover theological or religious
assumptions hidden in legal doctrine or jurisprudence. See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander, Beyond
Positivism: A Theological Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 1089 (1986); Ruth Colker, Feminism,
Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011
(1989); Arthur J. Dyck, Beyond Theological Conflict in the Courts: The Issue of Assisted
Suicide, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 503 (1995)(arguing that hidden religious
assumptions in judicial opinions about suicide are inappropriate); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan
Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923 (1991).
56
See, e.g., Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers Be Saved? The Theological Legal Ethics of
Thomas Shaffer, 10 J. LAW & RELIG. (1993-94); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of
Atticus Finch, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 181 (1981).
57
See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY
(1985); MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW (1981); MILNER S. BALL, THE
WORD AND THE LAW (1993).
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existing legal doctrine;58 or their own theological arguments about the practice of
law,59 or particular legal problems such as Free Exercise jurisprudence,60 civil
rights,61 or criminal law and procedure.62
Although there is some danger in borrowing from religion in legal
interpretation,63 the analogical method presents perhaps the most useful way of
incorporating religious insights into the secular discussion of constitutional issues.
While a theory of appropriate analogy is beyond the scope of this article, it is
important to say a few words about why it might be more legitimate to use analogy
to borrow from religious traditions than theological reasoning deductively applied to
a legal case.
To accept the possibility of analogy between a sectarian religious argument and a
“secular” legal argument is to accept the “similarity-in-difference”64 which is
analogical reasoning. It is to accept the notion that two widely divergent systems of
human meaning might be able to find common referents, common “moments of
recognition” of that which is both disclosed and concealed in analogical argument.65
It is just such moments that can illuminate our quest to understand who we are as
human beings and what we might become as a constitutionally organized
community. To illustrate with just one example, if as radically different conversation
partners, we can see theological and secular correspondences on the nature of human
beings (e.g., that they are self-interested and self-justifying), we can agree to those
understandings without being required to adopt fully the world-views from which
they came, the secular economics world of the rational maximizer or the Christian
world of the idolatrous sinner. And we can work with such understandings in a
58

See, e.g., Robert J. Araujo, Political Theory and Liberation Theology: The Intersection
of Unger and Gutierrez, 11 J. LAW & RELIG. 63 (1994-95); R. Conte, Toward a Theological
Construct for the New Biology: An Analysis of Rahner, Fletcher, and Ramsey, 11 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 429 (1995); H. Jefferson Powell, The Gospel According to Roberto: A
Theological Polemic, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1988); Joel E. Friedlander, Comment,
Constitution and Kulturkampf: A Reading of the Shadow Theology of Justice Brennan, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1049 (1992); David S. Clark, Judge Posner’s Theology and the Temples of the
Law—The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1183 (1985) (book review).
59
See, e.g., JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH
PRACTICE (1996).

AND

LEGAL

60

See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782 (1992).
61

See Rachel Mariner, Burdens Hard to Bear: A Theology of Civil Rights, 27 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 657 (1992).
62
See THE CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILTY A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING (Crawford & Quin eds., 1991); George C. Thomas III & David
Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative Crime Control Theology, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
123 (1988).
63
Steven Smith notes the dangers of assuming that legal interpretation is a “religious
enterprise,” for instance, see Smith, supra note 17, at 587.
64

TRACY, supra note 41 at 20-21, 92-93.

65

Id. at 20. See also RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5 (describing the indeterminacy of
shared moral premises as “the mediation of dissensus”).
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practical way without diverting our attention to whether we can irrefutably prove the
validity of those understandings using science, logic or other forms of certainty
reasoning.
Analogy permits a diversity of meanings to exist independently, refusing to dilute
any of them to a commonly defined meaning, and permitting each to retain its
distinctive differences, the complexity and intensity of its understanding of the truth.
Indeed, it is the strength of analogy that permits illumination of those differences
critically necessary to the uniqueness of a tradition, without allowing such
differences to become an insuperable barrier to our understanding each other. Or as
Tracy puts it, an analogical imagination
can remind conversation partners that difference and otherness once
interpreted as other and as different are thereby acknowledged as in some
way possible and, in the end, analogous. Any one who can converse can
learn to appropriate another possibility. . . .[T]here exists in every
authentic conversation an openness to mutual transformation.66
In particular, analogy may provide a way of avoiding the battle waged among
Christians and perhaps others between natural law and revelation as the basis for
judging the moral validity of positive law. Analogy gives our pluralistic culture an
alternative to natural law, for it does not insist on prior agreement that truth
(including religious truth) is discoverable by observation of the natural world and/or
human reason, without the need for special revelation or religious commitment.
(Such an agreement may be more troublesome to many religious people than to the
non-religious in our culture!) Nor does it demand the acceptance of a particular
revelation as a predicate for discussing moral truth. Thus, analogy permits us to
dispense with some religious preconditions before we can begin to hear or respond to
religious arguments in constitutional litigation.
Religious traditions are particularly important sources for analogy in
constitutional reasoning in a deeply ambiguous, pluralistic culture like our own
because religions are “exercises in resistance,”67 particularly resistance to “more of
the same” that blind adherence to political consensus or tradition can represent. This
resistance is necessary if humans are going to be creative in generating law that
reflects the sacredness of their own existence together. Religious traditions can issue
a radical challenge to the seductions of the law—the drive to simplify complexity, to
cling to the past, to resolve the past without responding to the present, to quickly
identify the needs of two sole litigants with our common aspirations, in fact the drive
not even to see those litigants:
Through their knowledge of sin and ignorance, the religions can resist all
refusals to face the radical plurality and ambiguity of any tradition,
including their own. Through their most fundamental beliefs in Ultimate
Reality, the religions can resist the ego’s compulsive refusal to face the
always already power of that Ultimate Reality that bears down upon us.
The religions also resist the temptations of many post-modernists to see
the problem but not to act. But the religions also join secular

66

TRACY, supra note 41 at 93.

67

Id. at 84.
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postmodernity in resisting all earlier modern, liberal or neoconservative
contentment with the ordinary discourse on rationality and the self.68
Analogy permits the possibility of a conversation between religion and law which is
at once committed and critical, each challenging the other “through every
hermeneutic of critique, retrieval, and suspicion we possess”69 without refusing to see
correspondence where it exists.
The use of the analogical model permits a religious judge who sees disjunctures
between the “common wisdom” and his religious world view to refuse the elements
of that “common wisdom” which jar. For instance, a religious judge might be
skeptical of a popular world-view that the human body is personal property. A judge
who, working from his religious world-view, understood the human body as sacred
or “given” could refuse to apply a property metaphor in an abortion, child custody,
or organ transplant case, this time based on the dissimilarity between religious and
secular world-views, as analogical reasoning permits. And still, we might
legitimately demand that such a judge not justify his decision using the language of
“sacredness” unless he is prepared to show its acceptance in secular as well as
religious human rights discourse.70
Analogical adaptation (suggesting likenesses as well as differences) rather than
theological inference (applying theological principles or assumptions to particular
situations) is a more useful way to proceed in critiquing law in a pluralistic society
for other reasons.
First, many religious views, including Lutherans’, do not understand most moral
situations to be resolved by a direct command by God to do action A or refrain from
A.71 For such believers, analogy represents a better strategy than deductive
reasoning, because it would be incoherent to argue that a theological doctrine results
in a particular jurisprudence. For instance, the reasoning that certain judgments or
outcomes (such as absolute pacifism) ineluctably follow from the Christian faith is
foreign to the basic Lutheran understanding of faith as a way of seeing a moral
situation, a way of imagining a new relationship between the self and the neighbor.
In the Lutheran view, Christian obedience is not ordered in an authority-subservience
political model, at the command of a Divine Voice, even though law is, in some
senses, a demand on the self. Instead, obedience is a way of responding to the gift of
one’s own freedom,72 expressed in the paradoxical language that we are freed for
servanthood, freed to be bound in response to the neighbor’s need. It is not a set of
prescriptions or outcomes. Analogical reasoning, or the use of metaphorical
language (to suggest its literary analogue), permits a larger discussion about what
inference one may draw from an image, a factual situation, or even a moral principle
than mechanical application of a theological insight might yield.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Michael Perry makes this case in RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5.

71

Carl E. Braaten, God in Public Life: Rehabilitating the “Orders of Creation,” FIRST
THINGS, Dec. 1990, at 32, 36. Lutherans subscribe to a version of natural law, described at
more length at note 176-78 infra and accompanying text.
72

Id. at 35-36.
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The potential evil of analogical argument must also be faced: analogy permits not
only the confusion of multiple possibilities, but the consequent justification of unjust
action or inaction. Indeed, to take my immediate example, Lutherans have been
justly criticized as “quietistic” sometimes for their failure to firmly demand
particular legal outcomes,73 or their failure to act at all in the face of injustice. And
some of those who called themselves Lutherans have conversely participated in
unspeakable injustice, distorting the central claims of the faith while claiming its
heritage.74 However, these facts do not differentiate Lutherans from others who
consider themselves bound more unambiguously by the dictates of a sacred text. As
Lutherans recognize, all human beings, whatever their convictions, are sinners who
can believe and yet not live up to their beliefs, who can distort the claims of any faith
and indeed blaspheme the sacred name in causes of their own self-delusion and selfinterest, who can justify injustice even from their own sacred texts.
Second, it is difficult to know precisely what might be lost in applying
theological doctrine to a particular human endeavor when God drops out of the
sentence. However, any person of faith must understand that loss to be
immeasurable and even be fearful of the profound disrespect for God inherent in
such activity. In a directly theological argument, the limits of human ability to keep
a theocentric focus can be recognized; but the trustworthiness of theological
reflection when one moves from a discussion of God’s relationship to us, to our
relationship to each other (the ethical) is less clear. Analogical or metaphorical
application by its method recognizes the incommensurability of talk about the
creative work of God and talk about human attempts to instantiate that work in
practical ways.
Yet, hospitality is better served by an analogical rather than an interpretive
response to theological understandings. As many thoughtful writers, among them
Pat Keifert75 and Michael Perry,76 have concluded, we who are strangers—each of us
to some other’s particular religious or secular tradition or experience—must all be
welcomed to a conversation about what constitutes the good. Welcoming the

73

See THOMAS W. STRIETER, CONTEMPORARY TWO-KINGDOMS AND GOVERNANCES
THINKING FOR TODAY’S WORLD: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TYPES OF INTERPRETATION
OF THE TWO-KINGDOMS AND GOVERNANCES MODEL, ESPECIALLY WITHIN AMERICAN
LUTHERANISM 63-64 (1986) (dissertation, Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago). Karl
Barth, among others, properly criticized the 20th century distortions in Lutheran ethics that
separated the worldly realm or kingdom from God’s authority and suggested that the Gospel
had nothing to do with the worldly realm.
74

Id. at 52-72.These distortions led to “ethical bankruptcy” on social justice and political
doctrines of a number of German Lutheran theologians during the Hitler era, including the
Rengsdorft Theses which stated that Christianity had its roots in the German nation and that
there was no contradiction between allegiances to the Gospel and to the Nazi state. Id. at 6475. This theological position, however, was met strongly by the Barmen Theological
Declaration led by Karl Barth and others, who “revitalized the concept of the ‘lordship of
Christ’ relating it to all of life,” although Barth ultimately broke from the Lutheran tradition by
understanding law as the will of God manifested by grace and our acceptance of that grace,
rather than distinct and prior to the Gospel. Id. at 68-73.
75

PATRICK KEIFERT, WELCOMING THE STRANGER (1992).

76

LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 43-51.
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stranger is pragmatic (how can a people be governed by a language which they do
not understand?) and it is ethically demanded. In a pluralistic democratic culture,
that ethic is embedded deep within culture, necessary for its survival, and hence not a
“nice thing to do” but an imperative.
While analogical argument does not create immediate understanding among
persons of different faith traditions, it has a greater chance of permitting a wider
dialogue among people with very different religious understandings. Just as people
from different cultural traditions can find meaning in the communal narratives of
others, analogy permits diverse peoples to find common ground without surrender of
the particularities of their beliefs, and to bring creative insights into interpretation of
the analogy itself. The possibilities for such rich diversity are particularly potent for
metaphors and other images that resonate in countless fresh ways.
Analogical argument also has a better chance of avoiding the “trump” syndrome
at the heart of so many fears about religion in public: the concern that the believer
will attempt to triumph over his non-believing or different-believing conversational
partner by arguing that such a person “doesn’t really understand” the demands of
God or the claims of a particular religious tradition from which the root meaning is
drawn.
Finally, whether one argues that an individual must ethically speak out of a voice
clear to all in public policymaking, or one welcomes voices of those who cannot in
conscience speak “ecumenically”, analogical argument permits the possibility of
common ground without requiring prior agreement on the rules for conversation. As
such, it may welcome to the conversation those religious and non-religious people
who fear that they may have to concede an important truth to be taken seriously.
III. SITUATING LUTHERANS IN THE PROTESTANT WORLD
The situation of the Lutheran Justice faced with a constitutional dilemma is a
perfect concrete case to explore what specific insights a Lutheran jurist might borrow
from his faith to understand the human context of the case, and the parameters of his
role as a jurist. Lutheranism as a body of thought offers a proposal of paradox:
human beings who are good creations with corrupted wills, worlds of law and love
that co-exist, and freedom to act that is constrained by gift and service rather than
rules.
As Carl Esbeck illustrates, and church-state debates often ignore, there are any
number of Christian positions on the relationship between the state, the church and
the individual, even counting only Protestant positions.77 Some religious positions
have loomed in the background of Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly in free
exercise cases,78 while others (like Lutheranism) have been largely overlooked in
constructing church-state paradigms.
Esbeck and Michael McConnell have situated Lutheranism in a “paradoxical
position” in their typologies of American religious views of church and state

77
Carl H. Esbeck, A Typology of Church-State Relations in Current American Thought, in
RELIGION, PUBLIC LIFE AND THE AMERICAN POLITY 3 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 1994).
78

Some authors suggest that Puritanism has had a major influence on American law. See
id., at 5-6. Levinson, supra note 14 at 1050, 1054.
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relations.79 Utilizing H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture to organize modern
American80 religious views on church-state issues into typologies, McConnell
situates Lutheranism in the model which he terms “Church Accommodated by
Culture.” In terms of prioritizing loyalties to one’s faith and the state, McConnell
includes in the Accommodated model those denominations who accept “the ordinary
morality and natural reason of the culture insofar as they go. But they also recognize
obligations to a higher standard, not based on the values of the secular world.”81
Thus, they seek to adhere to both worldly and Christian values, recognizing that they
are distinct. While Martin Luther and the Apostle Paul are included in this
McConnell group, Niebuhr describes Lutherans as part of a distinct “Christ and
Culture in Paradox” group.82 This “Paradox” group understands the “conflict
between the City of God and the City of Man,” joining radical Christians in
“pronouncing the whole world of human culture to be godless and sick unto death,”
but knowing that they “belong to that culture and cannot get out of it.”83
Paradox/Accommodated theologies thus take distinctively different positions
toward the problem of church vs. state loyalties compared with other Christian
positions. Unlike Church Apart from Culture groups84 and Church in Conflict with

79

McConnell’s project is to describe religious views about how the law should respond to
their religious, normative demands and “[h]ow far . . . the normative authority of the world
extend[s].” Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination
of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 192 (1992). Esbeck’s proposal is
to describe different categories of ecclesiology and philosophy of the state, and how the state
and church should be related, given those understandings. Esbeck, supra note 77 at 3-24; cf.
THIEMANN, supra note 7, at 95-114 (typing liberalism’s critics as sectarian communitarians
and liberal revisionists). To avoid confusion, I will be largely following McConnell’s
typology, mindful that I am losing some of the rich complexity of Esbeck’s scheme that
focusses on five concerns:
a. the purpose and authority of government and the nature of the church;
b. the juridical protection accorded religious speech;
c. the degree of autonomy accorded a church or other religious organization;
d. discrimination by the state in the distribution of goods and opportunities [along
religious lines]; and
e. juridical protection accorded religiously based conscience.
Esbeck, supra note 77, at 6.
80
McConnell also adds two historical models of the relationship between Christianity and
Culture. One is “Church Controlling Culture” or theocracy, the model in which a single church
“has actual political authority” rather than simply the power to persuasion. McConnell, supra
note 79, at 218. The other “Culture Controlling Church”, which McConnell sees in the
Church of England, “is the view that the church is subordinate to the civil authorities.” Id.
Neither of these models is currently recognized in American jurisprudence as an option,
according to McConnell, except perhaps in cases of church property disputes. Id.
81

Id. at 209.

82

Id. at 210.

83

Id. (quoting H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 156).

84

McConnell notes that this group is subsumed in Niebuhr’s typology as a subgroup of
Christ Against Culture. McConnell, supra note 79 at 194.
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Culture groups,85 Lutherans do not see themselves as “radical” Christians forced, as a
matter of worldly polity, to choose between the irremediably evil world and Christ.86
Unlike Church Apart from Culture groups, such as the Amish and some fundamental
Protestants,87Lutherans do not feel impelled to separate themselves culturally and
even physically from the wider society; they do not ask to be let alone by the legal
system. Indeed, they would resist the Apart denominations’ abandonment of the
public sphere to secularism conditioned upon the world’s response granting them
religious accommodations, as the Supreme Court did for the Amish in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.88 Nor would Lutherans fully align with McConnell’s “Church in Conflict
with Culture” groups, who choose not to opt out but to live in conflict with the state,
radically committed to Jesus Christ and his teachings as authoritative for public
life.89 Lutherans recognize the state not as the evil other, but as a divine gift for
which gratitude is owed and critique demanded.
Lutherans would thus similarly reject the response of Esbeck’s “strict
separationists” who want “a state that is decidedly nonreligious but not necessarily
hostile to religion”90 and “aspire to government unalloyed by even vestiges of
religion from bygone days.”91 Whether they are secular, only vaguely religious
people or Christ against Culture believers fearful of persecution, strict separationists
try to avoid traditional religious influence on civic or public matters, so that public
issues such as education, law, and economics are publicly debated in purely secular
terms. Rejecting this strict division, Lutherans would want to avoid three outcomes
Esbeck identifies from strict separationism, which ironically parallel the expected
outcome of Justice Rehnquist’s views:92 dualistic lives, split between a privatized

85

The best comparison with McConnell’s Church Apart and Church in Conflict groups in
Esbeck’s formulation are the “freewill separationists,” who insist on “soul freedom” or
voluntaristic religion, which must include freedom from a government incompetent to
determine which religious world view is correct. Esbeck, supra note 77 at 10. Such a
government, in the freewill separationist view, will prostitute the churches to serve the civil
power. Prophetic freewillers who are “calling [the state] back to its true course” have been
selectively involved in issues of personal morality, such as gambling, pornography, and
alcohol; peace issues; and social welfare, labor and hunger legislation. Id. at 11-12.
86

McConnell, supra note 79 at 196, 198-99.

87

McConnell notes that these groups are increasingly ending up on the losing side of
church-state battles. Id. at 198.
88

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

89

McConnell, supra note 79, at 198-99. For example, sanctuary movement workers and
religious objectors to the draft, have “insisted not only that [they were] obliged to adhere to a
standard of conduct that differs from the government’s, but that the wider society should
conform to the religious standard as well.” Such groups, McConnell argues, invariably lose
when they challenge government on an issue that “matters much” to the government.” Id. at
202.
90

Esbeck, supra note 77, at 7.

91

Id. at 8.

92

Esbeck’s strict separationists and Justice Rehnquist’s views on religion tend to lead to
the similar separation of important human values and experiences, even though Justice
Rehnquist, rejects the strict separation argument in his Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
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family life and secular public life; a marginalized, trivialized “therapeutic” religious
life focussed on personal beliefs; and the employment of pragmatic instrumentalism
and “liberal political theory” alone for public choices.93
Lutherans would agree with Esbeck’s “institutional separationists” on three
points:
A. “[A] universal, transcendent point of reference or ethical system for the state
exists and is required in order to secure human rights and maintain a republican
structure of government.”94 Indeed, Lutherans acknowledge the role of natural law
and the priority of independent human reason about the nature of the good, although
the state, as organized in positive law, is equally seen as good, however infected it
may be with human sin.95
B. The state must be theocentric but not theocratic. That is, the state is not
bound by a set of theological particulars, like a positive law superseding the
Constitution, yet (paradoxically) the theological worldview of separationists should
be used as precedent. Church and state should “maintain distinct responsibilities that
should be honored as each institution fulfills its proper role.”96 Yet, because both
“the people” and human institutions are fallen, the will of God must be recognized as
in some sense “higher” law if the state is to have any check .97
As Esbeck’s typology suggests, Lutherans do not understand divine authority or
texts as prescribing a jurisprudence or particular legal order. Lutheranism recognizes
three major forms of critique of the legal order: in serious cases, where the witness
to the Gospel itself is jeopardized by the state, the church must stand in statu
confessionis, against each and every presumption of the state (as in Nazi Germany);
in cases of significant departure from the most fundamental presumptions of natural
law, including the duty to the neighbor, Christians must stand in prophetic critique of
the state; and in all cases, Christians are obliged to participate as loving
creator/critics of law, and to use their gifts in service of the community, including the
state if they have the vocation to do so.98
C. Religious people have the duty “to preserve the good in culture and reform
the bad.”

see, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)(majority opinion); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School Dist, 509 U.S. 1, 5 (1993)(majority); Committee for Public Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 811-12 (1973)(dissenting).
93

Esbeck, supra note 77, at 9. In addition, strict separationists tend to view religious
freedom broadly, to include any philosophically based conscientious objection, and vigorously
protect consciences from coercion, particularly those of minority religions. Id.
94

Id. at 13.

95

Braaten, supra note 71, at 33-34.

96

Esbeck, supra note 77, at 15.

97
Id. at 13; Human Law and the Conscience of Believers (statement of the American
Lutheran Church, October 20, 1984).
98

STRIETER, supra note 73, at 9, 45-46, 111, 214, 248-49, 277; Braaten, supra note 71, at

35.
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Lutherans and Esbeck’s institutional separatists99 share the view that the
privatized faith of strict separationists and secularism’s narcissism are a more
immediate threat to culture than isolated violations of religious liberty that might be
occasioned by religiously informed pursuit of the good.100 They probably depart
from others in Esbeck’s category in being much more concerned about the harm civil
religion can cause to the mission of the church, by potential confusion of social
expectations and the Gospel.101 While they too believe that faith must be integrated
into all aspects of life, Lutherans might not precisely advocate “an achievable
balance between proclaiming eternal values and addressing the present in a practical
and humble manner,”102 because they would understand these concerns to be
different dimensions of life rather than extremes needing to be balanced.
Lutherans would similarly not view the world with McConnell’s Churches
Aligned with Culture (Niebuhr’s “cultural Christians”), who tend not to see tensions
between the Church and culture, but “interpret culture through Christ,” and
“understand Christ through culture,” selecting elements of each which are most in
accord with the other.103 Unlike Cultural Christians, Lutherans are suspicious about
borrowing “the highest ideals of our culture” or fully cooperating with the
government to ensure that shared social and moral objectives will be more
effectively reached, for they have a realistic view about human distortion of political
ideas and social progress. Because of their cautious view about the possibilities for
social progress in a world peopled by sinners, Lutherans are similarly wary of
“Church Influencing Culture” groups seeking to “reclaim and uplift the world”
which in their view is not evil, but perverted and convertible to good.104
99

Esbeck defines institutional separationists as agreeing on a universal transcendent point
of reference for the state, theocentric but not theocratic, viewing religious speech as important
because the church must influence public policy in an integrated way, and viewing privatized
faith as a threat to public life while having confidence that a state in which religious language
is well-heard can still protect minority religions by promoting the values of tolerance and
civility. Esbeck, supra note 77, at 12-15.
100

Id. at 14.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 14-45.

103

McConnell, supra note 79 at 204 (quoting H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE
83 (1951)).
104
Id. at 214. Niebuhr describes these groups as Christ Transforming Culture groups.
Citizens in McConnell’s Church Influencing Culture model are fully entitled to participate in
public life to achieve their ideas, id. at 215, and “‘political activism by the religiously
motivated’” is recognized as “part of our heritage.” Id. at 216 quoting Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Esbeck’s scheme, Niebuhr’s “cultural
Christians” and McConnell’s “Church Influencing Culture” groups might be
nonpreferentialists, who want a nondenominational state that recognizes traditional religion as
the basis for inculcating fundamental moral virtues necessary to citizenship. In the
nonpreferentialist view, religious organizations serve as the foremost mediating institution
between individual and state, and provide the individual with “a sense of community in an
often impersonal world.” Nonpreferentialists would permit governmental aid, including
symbolic aid, to religion so long as there was no coercion of conscience. Esbeck, supra note
77, at 18.
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McConnell believes that the “Accommodated” groups’ views, symbolized by
Roger Williams, “lie at the intellectual foundation of the First Amendment,” in that
they recognize the simultaneous corruption of the church and state which occurs
when the two are aligned.105 Separation of these spheres reinforces the simultaneity
of a citizen’s allegiance to both spheres while recognizing the difference in claims
between the civil and spiritual “kingdoms.” Yet, the Free Exercise Clause is
available to reduce the dissonance between religious dictates and worldly norms, to
permit full citizenship in both the civil and religious realms.106 However,
McConnell’s explanation does not fully capture the tensions in the Lutheran position
that neither separation nor Free Exercise can fully resolve.
Luther’s work on the problem of transcendent law accounts for the paradoxes the
McConnell/Niebuhr/Esbeck typologies identify. Luther accepts much of the natural
law tradition: that human beings have the capacity to reason about their own
situation and to understand how they must order their lives apart from faith (although
they do not have the capacity to reach or comprehend God on their own).107 He
accepts that such a capacity is a gift from God to everyone, not just a chosen few. 108
Luther suggests, however, that human nature reveals incapacity as well as
capacity, human wickedness as well as goodness. He replies to Erasmus that “free
choice, or the most excellent thing in men—even the most excellent men, who were
possessed of the law, righteousness, wisdom, and all the virtues—is ungodly,
wicked, and deserving of the wrath of God[; but] [t]he righteousness of God is
revealed and avails for all and upon all who believe in Christ. . . .”109 And he further
declares that in God’s sight, those most devoted to keeping the law in its detail, or
the “works” of the law, are farthest from fulfilling the law, because they lack the
Spirit who truly fulfills the law. 110 In that claim, Luther gives insight into the central
animating paradoxes of Lutheranism, some of which have eluded modern Western
thought about law and particularly judicial review.

105

McConnell, supra note 79, at 210.

106

Id. at 210-211.

107

Braaten, supra note 71, at 34.

108
George W. Forell, Luther and Conscience and The Political Use of the Law in MARTIN
LUTHER: THEOLOGIAN OF THE CHURCH 59, 89 (Word and World Supplement Series 2, 1994).
109

Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in MARTIN LUTHER’S BASIC THEOLOGICAL
WRITINGS 173, 180 (Timothy F. Lull ed., 1989).
110

Id. at 190.
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IV. TURNING TO JUSTICE REHNQUIST: JUXTAPOSING LUTHERAN THEOLOGY AND
REHNQUIST’S CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
In my view, Justice Rehnquist’s failure to be Lutheran in his jurisprudence111
severely impoverishes it. A review of his work suggests that Rehnquist as a jurist
fails to accept the theological insights of the Lutheran tradition about the relationship
between God and human beings. He also fails to borrow analogically from
Lutheranism in ways that could lead to a more nuanced version of his own
principles, and which could bring more complexity to the forensic and epideictic
aspects of his opinions.
A Lutheran jurist who thought his faith was relevant to his work would come to
the table with certain theological understandings about the relationship between the
individual and the state. Because these are theological understandings—that is, God
is a necessary actor in these sentences, and without God, they cannot make any
sense—Rehnquist might be legitimately subjected to criticism for justifying
decisions in these ways, but they might serve as important background for the
forensic and epideictic aspects of his opinions. More importantly, Lutheran theology
also leads the way to several somewhat paradoxical positions on the large problems
of jurisprudence, such as the relationship between the individual, authority, and the
state, which can be fruitfully borrowed.
These Lutheran understandings potentially conflict, in important ways, with the
major themes identified by students of William Rehnquist’s jurisprudence as well as
some of his public pronouncements on the judicial office:112
Strict Constructionism:
Internally to his discipline, Justice Rehnquist’s
interpretive approach to the Constitution is characterized by most scholars as “strict
construction,” planning a limited role for the judicial use of reason in resolving a
constitutional dispute.113
State Sovereignism: In terms of relationships of power and authority, Justice
Rehnquist almost invariably sides with the state, writ large, in conflicts between the
individual or his group and the state; and the state, writ small, in conflicts between
111

Howard Lesnick helpfully notes the distinction between judges who seek to do what
their religion demands of them, and those who seek to understand the teachings of their
religion, and to consider what they say about how they should do their job as a jurist. Letter
from Howard Lesnick (May, 1997) (on file with author). And, one can, of course, embody
Christian virtues or even follow denominational expectations without understanding a
denomination’s teachings; and can understand the faith without living it or even following
specific religious dictates. This article does not attempt the former, to describe an ethics of
Lutheran judging, but it does commingle the questions of what Lutheran judges understand
about their own role in securing justice, and how they think law and legal institutions must
themselves be organized to account for both the Creation and the Fall.
112
A former law clerk, Robert Giuffra, identified Rehnquist’s jurisprudence themes as
deference, interpretivism, and federalism and state autonomy. IRONS, supra note 13, at 331
(1994). Irons reports that one study found that these factors predicted Rehnquist’s votes
between 85-100% of the time. Id.
113
SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 28-29 (1989)(hereinafter
Davis); D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 14-17. But see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, The Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism, and the Originalist Fallacy, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
679, 690, 692 (1994) (arguing that Rehnquist is more committed to his substantive ideology
than to originalism or any interpretive theory).
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the federal and the state government.114 Other writers have described this constant as
a preference for “order over liberty” or “the rights of majorities ahead of the rights of
individuals.”115 He has also been termed deferential to the views of other
governmental actors in his judicial role.116 The one glaring, indeed troubling,
exception is his fierce protection of traditional private property, which does not
extend to the protection of government entitlements or benefits as private property.117
Positivism: In his understanding of the relationship of law and morality,
reviewers of his work have found in Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence a commitment
to legal positivism.118 By that, they reference Rehnquist’s belief that there is no
moral critique available to Americans to substantiate the propriety of particular
legislation.119
Thomas Merrill describes Rehnquist as an “ideal pluralist” or “ultrapluralist.”120
An ultrapluralist understands democratic politics as a process of aggregating or
summing private, divergent interests and values that are “largely exogenously
determined, in the sense that they are not much influenced by participation in the
political process.”121 Public decisions will produce public policies “based on
compromise [not necessarily] a coherent conception of the common good.”122
114

D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 19-22; DAVIS, supra note 113, at 24-26; David L. Shapiro,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 294 (1976); Thomas W.
Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 621, 623 (1994); Glenn A. Phelps & John B Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence:
Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 573 (1991). It is perhaps interesting that Justice Rehnquist’s first
memorable case as Justice Jackson’s clerk involved the Steel Seizure Case, in which the
President’s lawyers claimed that constitutional limitations applied only to Congress, not the
President. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Rehnquist’s
lengthy discussion underscoring his uneasiness with such a broad demand for power in his
book THE SUPREME COURT is telling. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 63-64
(1987).
115

Merrill, supra note 114, at 632; Shapiro, supra note 114, at 294.

116

Davis, supra note 113, at 17-19.

117

Mark Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1329-30 (1990)
(book review) (suggesting Rehnquist’s positions are more consistent with a Republican
ideology than a pure federalist one).
118

See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 113, at 23-24. Tushnet disagrees, noting that Rehnquist
does not uphold fundamentally wrong legislation such as private property takings. Tushnet,
supra note 117, at 1331-32.
119
See DAVIS, supra note 113, at 26, who asserts that Rehnquist is a moral relativist.
Federal Judge William Justice, who agreed with this assessment in replying to Justice
Rehnquist’s 1976 speech, argues that relativism was foreign to the Framers, and even went
beyond Holmes’ views in his critique of Justice Rehnquist, entitled “A Relativistic
Constitution.” IRONS, supra note 13, at 333-34.
120

Merrill, supra note 114, at 631. But see Zeppos, supra note 113, at 680-84
(characterizing Rehnquist as an originalist ultra-pluralist, not a dynamic ultra-pluralist,
sometimes enforcing the expectations of the original legislature rather than a later one).
121

Merrill, supra note 114, at 626.

122

Id.
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Democratic institutions reflect “an accurate weighing of majority and minority
interests” more than any other outcome.123
In the ultra-pluralist view, judges function as a branch of this system, acting “on
exogenously-determined values and reach outcomes based on bargaining and
compromise.”124 They are moral skeptics; that is, they think it is not meaningful to
speak about the common good, only about an individual’s personal tastes and
preferences.125 Thus, even a discussion among Justices about the majority and
dissenting opinions would be unavailing, as values are not shaped by dialogue.126
However one packages this set of views, if rigidly applied,127 they are inconsistent
with the theological values that inform Lutheranism.
A. Strict Construction vs. Law as Gift: Toward Affirming Universal Suspicion
A Lutheran View: Law, and the state, are a gift from God, but not a command
from God.128 Political authority is an order of creation, a means by which God
preserves humanity by ensuring order, peace and justice in the world,129 but its direct
progenitors are human. Thus, (paradoxically) law is always suspect as the creation
of human beings “deserving of wrath,” for the natural law discoverable by means of
human reason is always obscured by human evil.130 Or as Luther would say, Satan
blinds reason to the natural law.131
A constitutional judge’s view of his own internal discipline depends in large part
upon his views about two related issues: the judge’s faith in the power of reason,
and the legal body in which that faith is located. On the bench and within the
academy, both some interpretivists and non-interpretivists largely distrust human
reason and emotion, and they divide only on whom they most distrust and where
they will place authority in the wake of reason’s default. Interpretivists’ skepticism
over the ability of human reason to find the good is largely focussed on judges.132 In
123

Id.

124

Id. at 628.

125

Id. at 629.

126

Merrill, supra note 114, at 634-35.

127

Of course, any jurist might from time to time express the concerns that inform
positivism, statism, and strict construction without applying these concepts ideologically or
predominantly.
128

Braaten, supra note 71, at 33-35.

129

Christian Faith and U.S. Political Life Today 2 (ELCA Teaching and Discussion
Resource 1995) (describing the role of Government to “maintain peace, to establish justice, to
protect and advance human rights, and to promote the general welfare of all persons,” (quoting
The Nature of the Church and Its Relationship with Government (CALC, AELC, LCA 1984)).
130

Braaten, supra note 71, at 34; Christian Faith, supra note 129, at 2.

131

Human beings are also blinded to their own nature; as Luther explains, “[t]his
hereditary sin [original sin, which bears all subsequent evil deeds] is so deep a corruption of
nature that reason cannot understand it. It must be believed because of the revelation in the
Scriptures. . . . “ The Smalcald Articles, Lull, supra note 109, at 516.
132
See, e.g., Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional
Democracy, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 557, 563 (1994). Rehnquist understands the Court’s Equal

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/3

26

1998]

THE JUSTICE WHO WOULDN’T BE LUTHERAN

669

the most extreme cases, they reduce judicial review to searching out the beliefs of the
framers (intentionalism) or rubber-stamping the presumed will of the current
population (using the so-called majoritarian presumption).133 Justice Rehnquist’s
judicial skepticism regularly results in this sort of response, along with severe
epideictic criticism for his fellow judges, whom he has compared to “platonic
guardians” and Pontius Pilate.134 If the individual citizen is not to be trusted, surely
the jurist who appears as no more than an individual wolf in law’s clothing should
not lay claim to any special expertise on justice nor should he be self-righteous about
his calling. As Justice Rehnquist describes some judges:
[T]hey are a small group of fortunately situated people with a roving
commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and
federal administrative officers concerning what is best for the
country. . . .If there is going to be a council of revision, it ought to have at
least some connection with popular feeling.135
For mistrustful statists, the judicial role is to tell the litigants what the majority, or
their elected representatives, would have told them if the majority could have packed
into the courtroom, and not much more, although even Rehnquist will concede that
“[a] merely temporary majoritarian groundswell should not abrogate some individual
liberty truly protected by the Constitution.”136
Non-interpretivists who also distrust human reason tend to assume a skeptical
stance largely toward the legislative and executive branches. Where interpretivists
distrust the elitism, emotionalism, and arrogance of judges, these non-interpretivists
assume that legislative and executive action is often the product of power-lust, greed,
bureaucratic insensitivity or popular resentment against government employees and
minorities.137 For some rights advocates, the jurist’s task is to stand as a shield
Protection jurisprudence, for instance as “an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a
series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle.” Irons, supra note 13, at
247 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977)).
133

See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and
Institutional Design in State and Local Government, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 657 (1994); William
G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Application of ‘Neutral Principles’ in the
Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 St. LOUIS U. L. J. 263 (1987).
134
See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 13, at 252 (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 525 (1979)). For their judicial activism, Rehnquist has also accused his colleagues
of borrowing ideas from George Orwell’s 1984; and escape artist Houdini. Id. at 261
135

Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 698.

136

Id. at 697 (emphasis added).

137

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Interest Group Theory and the
Founders’ Design, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 577, 593 (1994) (discussing judicial insulation from the
interest group process). Such groups may also differ on whether national or state power is
most trustworthy, as demonstrated by the debate between Anti-Federalists, who believed that
smaller, more homogeneous states would enhance civic virtue; and Federalists, who thought
that larger, more heterogeneous constituencies would reduce the possibility of minority or
majority factional oppression. See Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter)
Majoritarian Institution: Misperceptions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, 1994
DET. C.L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994).
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between the oppressiveness of government and the vulnerability of the individual,138
and his obligations are limited only by the sharp edges of the constitutional text, the
finitude of judicial power, the limits of judicial wisdom, and practical matters such as
knowing who is telling the truth in a particular case.139 For some “critical legal”
theorists, majorities and power-holders are suspect, while minorities and powerless
people are not,140 except as they have false consciousness. Thus, in one feminist
critical model, men are oppressors and women are victims; the patriarchy silences
women who demand reproductive rights,141 but feminist collectives cannot wield
abusive power over women who disagree with the feminist platform. Again, the
contrast between good and evil is sharp: the patriarchy rarely does good, and
feminism rarely does evil.
Still other interpretivists and non-interpretivists have a high regard for the ability
of human reason to resolve individual and social problems. They want to believe
that lawmakers, if they only spend time reflecting without the taint of constituent
interest or bias, will eventually discover the course for the common good. Many
interpretivists locate these civic virtues in legislators, mouthpieces for the full range
of human concerns that their constituents hope to express in legislation.142 Noninterpretivists often locate civic reasoning in the judicial process.143 In their view,
judicial review is legitimated by the judges’ distance from the fray of politics and by
their power to use Prof. Bickel’s “passive virtues” and 14th Amendment review to
demand full rational re-consideration of laws by legislatures.144 Some pro-reasonists
imagine the individual as innocent by nature compared to the corruptibility of
corporate bodies, such as bureaucracies and legislators, and presume that the
individual, if left to his own devices, will more often than not do the right thing by
his neighbor. They represent a distinct contrast to many statists who suspect the
138

See ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: FREEDOM
FIRST 125-30 (1994)(describing Justice Brennan’s comparable “rights” views).
139
The rights model can perhaps most clearly be seen in the Warren Court development of
criminal procedural protections for individuals. For examples, see GOLDMAN & GALLEN,
supra note 138 at 179-192. The narrative summary in the development of those protections is
that the police are so tempted toward oppression for the sake of controlling criminals that the
only antidote is to take away their power to imprison each time they step out of line.
140

Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L. J. 1, 29
(1987); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1083 (1986).
141

See Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 793, 795-96 (1991).
142
For instance, Merrill claims that Justice Scalia posits “that legislative judgments reflect
an imminent rationality—a single coherent truth about the nature of mankind and the proper
ordering of human relationships.” Merrill, supra note 114, at 662.
143

See generally Owen Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990);
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1509 (1988). Obviously, it is possible
to create a complex matrix using the trust/distrust and judicial/legislative/executive categories,
even without qualifying them; but most theorists betray a preference for trust/distrust in the
rhetorical choices they make.
144

See D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 18 (arguing that the “keepers of the covenant” rationale
is embraced by them as well).
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individual for his own self-interest; some think democracy’s virtue is in canceling
out self-interest (or at least making it irrelevant) through majoritarianism. For
statists, the state can do no wrong, and individual citizens are suspect for raising any
questions about whether the state’s activity is proper.
The pure positivist approach, by contrast to all these theories, suggests that no
particular locus of power, individual, group or state, is subject to particular
suspicion; and none entitled to claim the moral high ground. In a purely positivist
conception, morality is a private irrational activity meant for private space; and in the
public arena, where no values can be demonstrably true, only a sustained
commitment to governmental process will provide community security for law. At
their most extreme, some interpretivists and non-interpretivists, such as Judge Bork
and Justice Rehnquist, sound like non-cognitivists: they muse that maybe there is no
such thing as right, even for the individual; there is only what individuals want and
feel.145
Lutheranism enlists the paradox of affirming, universal suspicion toward power
(ideological and practical) and its corruption in the individual and in society.
Lutherans affirm the world: they believe that human beings, and their governmental
and other structures of relationship, are a creation of God and therefore have the
capacity to reason about their situation and the common good. This fundamental
sense that God made human beings (and through them human institutions) and found
them good underlies any critical interpretation of individuals or structures; Lutherans
reject profound, radical skepticism about the human ability to create any government
that can do good, or participate in any sustaining and nurturing human activity. Nor
is pure positivism a solution, for moral concern is always, in the Lutheran
conception, a necessary part of governing.
On the other hand, Lutherans are universally skeptical of all human activity,
whether individual or bureaucratic, as in bondage to sin; the tremendous gifts of
thinking, speech and action with which human beings have been endowed are
mediated through a corrupt human will. Thus, boundless faith in the capacity of
individual or even collective human reason to fully understand the human condition
or to deduce the programme that will perfect human nature, or human institutions, is
equally misplaced.146 Liberationists are as suspect as authoritarians in this model,
individuals as much as governments.147 This paradox—that it is possible to affirm
and to be suspicious at the same time and about everyone—can be borrowed without
the theological predicate or story of origin, although it must be borrowed
analogically, due to the disjunctures between the relationships of God to humans,
and humans to humans.
Justice Rehnquist’s interpretive approach to the Constitution, most often
characterized even further as “strict construction,” evidences none of these Lutheran
premises. As a general matter, Rehnquist combines strict construction with
textualism,148 arguing for application of the plain meaning of the text, although he
145

See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1, 8-11 (1971); Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 317.
146

Braaten, supra note 71, at 36.

147

STRIETER, supra note 73, at 30, 243 (discussing Robert Jensen’s views).

148

See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U.S. 29, 3637 (1979)(rejecting plaintiffs’ “tortuous” construction of statutory language to effectuate
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will fall back on intentionalism149 or structuralism150 in the case of clear ambiguity.151
In Dworkin’s view, strict construction depends on the assumption that “what the law
is” is a matter capable of objective interpretation,152 that the interpreter himself (or
the power of his reason) is not part of the interpretive process if he narrowly reads
the words of the text. Rehnquist apparently agrees with this assessment.153
Yet, if both interpretivism and textualism can be signs of judicial denial, strict
construction textualism is potentially the most powerful form of denying the place
and the danger of the human will. Whereas an intentionalist must at least reconstruct
a human context and set of ideas specific to historical characters to give evidence for
his argument, a textualist purports to “find” the meaning of language apart from a
human context, within a “science” of linguistic understanding. (Prof. Stephen Smith
points out similar problems with some intentionalism theories, quoting a number of
modern interpreters for the proposition that intentionalists are not really trying to
discern the historical author’s voice.)154
congressional intent for the “plain language and legislative history” of an amendment to a
workers’ compensation act); Davis, supra note 113, at 28 n.11 (quoting Paul Brest who notes
that strict textualism is one of the most extreme forms of originalism). Tushnet argues that
Rehnquist’s federalism is structural, in contravention of a strict textualist approach. Tushnet,
supra note 117, at 1333.
149

Compare SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 150 (noting Rehnquist’s skepticism with Ed
Meese’s “original intent” theories) and Clor, supra note 132, at 559-60 (1994) (noting
Rehnquist’s distinction between specific authorial intentions and broad principles); with
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (school meditation or prayer legislation)
(Rehnquist attacks the “wall of separation” metaphor and “its mischievous diversion of judges
from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights”), and Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179 (1972) (Rehnquist castigates fundamental rights doctrine as a
“judicial superstructure . . . engrafted upon the Constitution itself,” while he advocates for
determination of rights based on the choices of “[t]hose who framed and ratified the
Constitution”). But see Phelps and Gates, supra note 114, at 589, 591 (noting strong
preference for doctrinal arguments by both Rehnquist and Brennan; relatively small difference
in textual versus extrinsic arguments by both).
150

Clor, supra note 132, at 561-62 (citing Davis, supra note 113, at 33-35).

151

Phelps and Gates, supra note 114, at 585. Ironically, the pragmatism Justice Rehnquist
employs against affirmative action programs is not employed in judicial review. In
Rehnquist’s book, THE SUPREME COURT, he notes both the way in which public opinion and
judicial temperament influence cases. Joseph S. Larisa, A Supreme Court Primer for the
Public, 1988 DUKE L.J. 203, 205, 207 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE
SUPREME COURT (1987)). Merrill disagrees with the characterization of Justice Rehnquist as a
textualist, citing cases in which he will fall back from “plain meaning” if contradicted by
legislative history and background.” Merrill, supra note 114, at 651-52.
152
D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 14-16 (citing DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-22
(1977)).
153
Davis, supra note 113, at 108 (belief in fixed meaning of the Constitution, which is “a
set of rules rather than a vision of a good society”); see Larisa, supra note 151, at 208 (quoting
Rehnquist’s view that personalities should not “encroach” into the judicial process, and
feelings that a law is silly are easily translated from “visceral reactions” into
unconstitutionality decisions).
154

Smith, supra note 17, at 594-95.
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The purported objectivism of which Dworkin speaks blinds the judge himself to
the prejudices and values he brings to bear on the text,155 not requiring him to locate
himself in relationship to the human beings and context of the case. The
presumption is doubly arrogant in that the strict construction textualist often
simultaneously berates non-interpretivists for their own injection of “personal
values” into the decision-making process. Thus, the “human” part of judicial
interpretation can be obscured or elided; and the dual nature of human understanding
as gifted and flawed likewise buried. As intentionalists probe a rich conflicting
treasure of characters and events to explore the dynamics of an interpretation,
textualists look at a desert in which one fixed, unchangeable meaning survives for
the past, present, and future.
In his textualism, Justice Rehnquist provides little evidence that he accepts the
Lutheran paradox of affirming, universal suspicion in doctrine or its application to
cases. Perhaps the most powerful example of Justice Rehnquist’s strict construction
textualism is his “bitter with the sweet” approach, first formulated to limit judicial
review of due process,156 but then loaned to other areas such as commercial speech.157
Rehnquist explains that “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, a litigant . . . must take the bitter with the sweet.”158 Combined
with Rehnquist’s view of textual interpretation, which requires that one must “stop
[at the statute’s text] if the text fully reveals its meaning,”159 his version of strict
construction precludes any challenge to the effects of a statute ostensibly “clear” on
its face. A court or executive officer may not challenge whether Congress acted
wrongfully or mistakenly in constructing a resolution of the public concern it faced;
and a litigant may not challenge the wrongful or unwise application of that statute to
his own situation through a due process hearing.
Loudermill, the case that overturns Rehnquist’s use of the “bitter with the sweet”
metaphor, is a potentially compelling case to illustrate its problems, because, in one
reading of the facts, the case results not even from evil intention, but from
155

As Spaeth and Teager suggest, “most people who have reached adulthood no longer
believe [the] myth [that judges only find and do not make law] anyway.” Harold J. Spaeth &
Stuart H. Teager, Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for Justices’ Policy Preferences, in
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 297 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds.,
1982).
156

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n,
496 U.S. 498, 527-28 (1990) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (guarantee of Medicaid “reasonable
and adequate” rates places limitation on rate review to Secretary’s review); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 559 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1984) (claimants’ due process complaint that they are required to
undergo hearings which in every case results in a determination that Medicare should pay for
their operations is inseparable from the substantive claim that the Secretary must pay for the
operations, precluded by exhaustion policy). See also Davis, supra note 113, at 102-09.
157
See, e.g., Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
346-47 (1986) (if state can ban “vice activity,” it can ban commercial speech about such
activity).
158

Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54.

159

Wilder, 496 U.S. at 526 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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administrative mistake. In Loudermill, the government asks what is apparently a
simple question—whether the applicant has been convicted of a felony—and
Loudermill answers what he honestly believes, that he has not. Had the state
constructed the question more carefully, to ask if Loudermill had been convicted at
all, Loudermill might have disclosed what he thought was a misdemeanor theft
conviction, which turned out to be a felony.160 And yet his legal mistake—that his
crime was a misdemeanor not a felony—is judged to be a lie; and he must lose his
job, under Rehnquist’s approach with no constitutional recourse to explain the
mistake. Similarly, in Fritz, strict constructionist Rehnquist refuses to look at
legislative context to see whether Congress was indeed misled to believe that it was
not taking vested benefits away from any retired railroadmen:161
[T]he plain language of [the statute] marks the beginning and the end of
our inquiry . . . where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’
action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, “constitutionally
irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision
. . .” because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate
its reasons for enacting a statute. . . . if this test [whether Congress was
unaware or misled by groups appearing before it] were applied literally to
every member of any legislature that ever voted on a law, there would be
few laws which would survive it.162
Rehnquist’s willingness to brush aside government mistakes that result in human
hardship is paralleled by his refusal to inquire into more serious, intentional attempts
by the government163 to circumvent the law or to harm individuals. In the area of
religious liberty and establishment jurisprudence, Rehnquist has been also
unrelenting in refusing to question whether the government’s motives for
suppressing or assisting religious expression are compatible with the concerns of the
First Amendment. In Establishment Clause cases, Rehnquist has called for an
evisceration of the “secular purpose” prong of the Lemon test, in line with his view
that government neutrality is a fiction not to be found in the Framers’ intentions.164
In his view, any legislative reason offered is sufficient to end judicial inquiry, even
in statutes where there is clear evidence that the legislature mixed impermissible
reasons (e.g., to endorse Christianity) with permissible reasons.165 In arguing for the
160

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535.

161

In Justice Brennan’s view, U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980) is a case of legislative mistake, in which Congress was misled. Id. at 194.
162

Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176, 179 (citations omitted), partially quoting Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
163

For that matter, Rehnquist seems indifferent to intentional individual actions that harm
persons. See infra notes 278-97 and accompanying text; Savage, supra note 13, at 32, 37.
164
D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 84; David Schimmel, Education, Religion & the Rehnquist
Court: Demolishing the Wall of Separation, 56 EDUC. L. REP. 9, 15 (1990) (Establishment
Clause prohibits establishment of national religion and discrimination among sects).
165

See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Rehnquist states, “The purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to express
any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references, because legislators might do just that.
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right of a state to require the posting of the Ten Commandments in Stone v.
Graham,166 and in the school prayer cases, Rehnquist has said that a secular purpose
stated on the face of the statute is sufficient to deflect judicial inquiry, even when
that secular purpose would seem thin compared to the religious ones.167
In the Free Exercise area, Rehnquist has supported the use of a “reasonableness”
test for evaluating state restrictions on even religious worship, negating the
opportunity for an inquiry into government dislike for minorities and their
concerns.168 Indeed, though a case of blatant discrimination against a minority
religion is in his view forbidden by the Framers’ intent,169 such discrimination has to
be unquestionable, as demonstrated when he dissented from a holding that
Minnesota’s religious solicitation statute was unconstitutional despite legislative
history indicating that it was directed against Moonies.170 His position is a mixed
blessing for majority religions: on one hand, he believes that government may
accommodate religion, but on the other, where a state or the federal government has
decided to limit freedom of religion, Rehnquist is deferential to that decision.171
In the case of public benefits, Rehnquist’s strict construction textualism similarly
leads him to decline the opportunity to look for government prejudice, disinterest or
outright mean intent. In Jefferson v. Hackney, for instance, he truncates inquiry into
Texas’ decision to grant disparate welfare grants to recipients of old age, blind and
disability assistance (who statistically were largely white); and AFDC assistance
Faced with a valid legislative secular purpose, we could not properly ignore that purpose
without a factual basis for doing so.”); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603 (1988)
(even if part of Adolescent Family Life Act was motivated by “improper [religious] concerns,”
statute will survive if also motivated by “other, entirely legitimate secular” concerns); Richard
A. Brisbin & Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny: Coalitional Conflict in the
Rehnquist Court, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1049, 1075, 1077, 1083 (1992); Schimmel, supra
note 164, at 11-14 (noting that Rehnquist views the primary effect prong similarly).
166

449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

167

See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610-36 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (state private school tuition deduction
program; the Court will not attribute unconstitutional motives to the state “particularly when a
plausible secular purpose for the state’s program may be discerned from the face of the
statute”). In his dissent in Wallace v Jaffree while expressing the skeptical view that the
purpose prong is easily evaded simply by an expression of secular purpose in the legislative
history, Rehnquist nevertheless notes, in a somewhat restated form, “we could not properly
ignore that purpose without a factual basis for doing so.” 472 U.S. 108 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
168

See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-52 (1987); Brisbin & Heck,
supra note 165, at 1066.
169
D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 86; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined
by Rehnquist, J.)
170

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 264 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

171

See D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 84-87; Schimmel, supra note 164, at 18. Rehnquist has
also expressed displeasure with incorporation of the Religion Clauses. Thomas v. Review Bd.
of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); D.
Davis, supra note 13, at 91-94.
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(who were largely black and Mexican), as fortuitous rather than intended.172 On one
hand, he declares that there is no evidence of such intent; on the other, he bans such
as inquiry as a matter of law.
This refusal to explore the context or human dynamics of law-making gives lie to
the Lutheran suspicion that all human activity, including the work of human
governors, is infected with sin, whether it is indifference to human suffering,
ignorant prejudice, or even malice. It refuses the notion that suspicion must be
leveled universally, a notion that can be borrowed analogically into judicial decisionmaking. Luther’s call for the ruler to “maintain an untrammelled reason and
unfettered judgment” with respect to other public officials173 cannot be fulfilled if the
judge refuses to investigate or to judge. Whether it is the individual Jehovah’s
Witness leafletting a city street, a collective of women advocating for their rights, or
the tremendous power of the federal government itself, Lutheranism cautions
skepticism about how human beings will justify their own actions and wield their
power. In the Lutheran conception, then, “rights” would not be assigned by
determining who are the good guys and who are the bad guys; they would be
assigned to uphold and nurture the human being, on one hand, and restrain his evil
ways on the other.
Similarly, the problem of judicial responsibility is framed by the paradox of
human beings who are both God’s creations and thoroughly sinners. Because the
jurist is skeptical as well about the powers of his own reason, he/she must design an
understanding that incorporates respect for other governmental institutions having
distinct responsibilities with a self-critical decision-making process that is always
inspecting the judge’s own prejudices and commitments. However, using the
doctrine of orders of creation, a Lutheran jurist might not approach such a problem in
the radically skeptical way that strict judicial constructionists have done, by defining
the judicial office over against the other locations of power within government.
Rather, the Lutheran position would construct a positive vision of the role of the
judge, both in restraining evil and in providing for the nurture of the community.
The “conservative” view of judicial interpretation uses the term “judicial restraint,”
which suggests that the jurist knows better than the legislature but forces himself not
to overrule them for some higher good; or “judicial deference,” which suggests an
uncritical bow to boundaries of legislative power. By contrast, a Lutheran jurist
would have a developed theory about the ways in which each branch of government
performs a peculiar task in the preservation and ordering of the world, recognizing
the office of the other governors within the system, while at the same time retaining
a critical perspective and relationship with each.

172
406 U.S. 535 (1972). As Justice Marshall points out, these disparities continued
because, as state officials put it, AFDC “is politically unpopular,” despite dramatic statistics in
the racial make-up particularly of the old age program (roughly 2/3 white and 1/3 non-white)
versus the AFDC program (roughly 87% black or Mexican). Id. at 575 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also Jerome M. Culp, Understanding the Racial Discourse of Justice
Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 610-11 (1994).
173

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 700.
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Moreover, the giftedness which marks a Lutheran understanding of law174 is
largely absent in a textualist approach. In one narrow sense, textualism attempts to
express the humility of the reader not as a constitutional creator but a constitutional
recipient. Textualism looks at constitutional meaning as a given: the text is there, it
does not reside within or come from ourselves, and we are stuck with it. We have to
live with its demands, even when we would do otherwise for short-term gains; we
have to live with the specific tradition from which the text came, for it is ours, even
if we would remake it.
But in another, more important sense, textualism (unlike intentionalism) neglects
the beneficiary’s imagination with which a Lutheran would approach a text. Unlike
ideological textualism, which focusses on the words themselves, as if their meaning
is a separate objective reality ultimately unrelated to those who write or read such
words, true giftedness is not most importantly about the characteristics of the gift
itself. The gift, the text, is most important as it creates a relationship of the giver and
the recipient. The gift is a signpost, pointing back to the intention of the giver, and
forward to the response of the recipient; but it also transforms intention and
response, the relation of giver and recipient into the future. Just as God’s giving of
law is understood to be the expression of God’s compassion for human beings, so the
giving of human law expresses a benevolent intention of the givers toward those who
receive. In the case of the founders, for instance, the Constitution may be thought of
as their expressed desire to leave an institutional legacy of freedom and equality
within the constraints of their culture. In this sense, strict ideological intentionalism
similarly rejects a giftedness approach by relifying the constitutional givers’
intentions inside the past moment, rather than accepting the motivation of the givers
to leave a lasting legacy for a changing context. Again, the theological predicate for
a “gift” understanding is not necessary so long as analogy is employed.
This relational understanding of interpretation transforms the attitudes and
actions (for good or ill) of the givers toward those who are its beneficiaries. And the
response of the people, those who receive the gift, will shape the tenor of the social
and political system in which they are immersed: their embrace of law, their
resistance (whether self-interested or conscientious), or their willingness to scoff at
or ignore it, will recreate the link between tradition, the present and the future
generations.
Luther described judging as this sort of gift relationship, that focusses on the
relational rather than the propositional:
For when you judge according to love you will easily decide and adjust
matters without any lawbooks. But when you ignore love and natural law
you will never hit upon a solution that pleases God, though you may have
devoured all the lawbooks and jurists. . . . A good and just decision . . .
must come from a free mind, as though there were no books. Such a free
decision is given, however, by love and by natural law, with which all

174

See, e.g., Braaten, supra note 71, at 37; GEORGE W. FORELL, FAITH ACTIVE IN LOVE 25,
129, 146 (1954)(describing the divine institution and presentation of secular authority.) It
should be noted that at other times, when Luther is explaining God’s saving action, he
describes law as God’s demand and grace as God’s gift, see Forell, supra note 108 at 85.
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reason is filled; out of the books come extravagant and untenable
judgments.175
By contrast, as an ideology rather than a constraint, strict construction textualism
borrows the divine watchmaker metaphor, neglecting the ongoing relational quality
of the gift of the Constitution or of the laws. In the watchmaker analogy, the
legislator or constitutional “framer” sets the law in motion, expects the courts to
ensure that the law runs smoothly and efficiently, and sees unexpected consequences,
including human suffering or social dislocation, as obstacles to the smooth purring of
the law. Such a construction no more realizes the Lutheran concept of law as gift
than it does the concept of moral relationship between lawmakers and public.
B. State-Sovereignism and Positivism: Toward Simultaneous Conflicting Loyalties
A Lutheran View:
1. Natural law, understood as a dynamic creation of God, is precedent
over positive law,176 and must be used to critically evaluate positive law;177
it is always and universally valid, though constantly being transformed,
while positive law is always situational. Even the natural orders,
however, cannot be so absolutized as to deny the freedom of God to do a
new thing in the world.178
Yet, paradoxically, government is ordained by God as a holy institution,
as a creating act of God,179 and thus deserves the obedience and respect of
those who live under its laws,180 even in some cases when they
independently conclude that positive law will bring about moral injustice
in the immediate case.181

175

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 702.

176

GEORGE W. FORELL et al., LUTHER AND CULTURE 14, 16 (1960). “In the state one must
act on the basis of reason . . . for God has subjected the government of this world and the
affairs of the body to reason.” Id. at 17 (quoting Luther’s Sermon on Keeping Children in
School (1530)). Unlike the traditional account of natural law, however, Lutherans reject a
static picture of creation in favor of an understanding that the orders of creation are dynamic
and changing, because God is free to do new things in the world. Moreover, Lutherans
understand that the creation has been distorted by the fall, so that the “discovery” of natural
law must always be viewed with suspicion. Id. at 33-34.
177
LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 18 (quoting Luther’s Commentary on the
Galatians). In Luther’s view, “[l]aw binding for rulers as well as the ruled because . . . it is
ultimately rooted in God’s will and authority.” Id. at 13.
178

Braaten, supra note 71, at 35.

179

Id. at 32, 37.

180

Luther quotes Romans 12, “authority which everywhere exists has been ordained by
God. He then who resists the governing authority resists the ordinance of God, and he who
resists God’s ordinance will incur judgment.” On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109,
at 659-60.
181
Luther’s strong stand against rebellion was in great part pragmatic and proceeded out of
his strong focus on care for the neighbor and recognition of authority as God’s gift. He noted

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/3

36

1998]

THE JUSTICE WHO WOULDN’T BE LUTHERAN

679

2. The government of this world imposes order upon the unjust;182 and its
symbol is the sword used to restrain evil,183 while the governance of Christ
redeems. Luther argued that both governments are necessary, the spiritual
to bring righteousness and the temporal “to bring about external peace and
prevent evil deeds.”184 Yet, as a creation of God, the secular government
goes beyond the use of force, and exercises an office similar to a parent,
nourishing and caring for its people. 185 Luther called for a four-fold
responsibility in the ruler: “true confidence and earnest prayer” toward
God; “love and Christian service” toward the subject; “untrammeled
reason and unfettered judgment” toward other government officials; and
“restrained severity and firmness” toward evildoers.186
Yet, he
acknowledged that a competent ruler need not be a Christian, that
“‘Caesar does not need to be a saint,’” so long as he uses reason to
exercise his authority.187
3. The Christian, who lives under the law and yet not under the law, and
for the neighbor,188 is called not to forsake government, but to serve God

that insurrection “is devoid of reason and generally hurts the innocent more than the
guilty. . . .The harm resulting from it always exceeds the amount of reformation
accomplished. . . .” LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 53 (quoting Luther’s An
Earnest Exhortation for All Christians Warning Them Against Insurrection and Rebellion
(1522)). Yet, Lutheranism calls upon Christians to resist the evil even of governors, to
“admonish and punish them on account of their injustice,” Strieter, supra note 73, at 43
(quoting Luther’s weekly sermons on John 16-20 (1528-29)), giving rise to debate about the
proper limits of conscientious disobedience.
182

As Luther explains, “Therefore God has established magistrates, parents, teachers, laws,
bonds and all civil ordinances, that, if they can do no more, at least they may tie the devil’s
hands so that he cannot rage after his pleasure.” LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 10
(quoting Luther’s Commentary on Galatians (1535)).
183

“[I]t is God’s will that the temporal sword and law be used for the punishment of the
wicked and the protection of the upright.” On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at
661; see also id. at 665.
184

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 666.

185

To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany, Lull supra note 109, at 712-13; On
Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 694 (exhorting the ruler to “serve and protect
[subjects], listen to their problems and defend them, and govern to the sole end that they, not
[the ruler], may benefit and profit from [his] rule”). Braaten notes that “some Lutheran
theologians prefer to speak of ‘orders of preservation,’ taking into account what God is doing
to sustain the world under the conditions of sin, even using means sin-laden themselves, such
as war and capital punishment, to fight against still more serious attacks on the goodness of
God’s creation.” Braaten, supra note 71, at 34.
186

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 700.

187

LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 29 (quoting Sermons (1528)).

188

Luther explains, “A man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body to work for
it alone, but he lives also for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others and not for
himself.” The Freedom of a Christian, Lull, supra note 109, at 616, 617.
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in government if the neighbor’s needs demand it.189 Yet, the call to serve
goes to others besides Christians; it is part of the natural law which stands
in critique of all positive law, especially that which does not adopt care as
its first principle.190
Lutherans employ the metaphor that human beings stand in (at least) two worlds,
simultaneously. As Esbeck and McConnell point out, the belief in dual loyalties to
God and world is not peculiar to Lutheranism, but the way in which Lutherans
resolve this problem is distinctive. Other traditions try to resolve this tension: those
who understand that they must choose between God and the world either separate
from the world or commit themselves to warfare against government when it
demands action in violation of the separationist’s radical faith commitment.191 As
suggested, in McConnell’s scheme following Niebuhr, some traditions align
themselves with culture; and compromise any tension between the Christian’s
commitment to this world and to his faith, understanding culture through Christ and
Christ through culture.192
Lutheranism, as McConnell points out, refuses to resolve this tension by
separation, battle, or compromise. However, Lutherans understand their relationship
to the world to be somewhat more positive than McConnell would describe it.
McConnell, following Niebuhr, describes Luther’s view as:
the Christian cannot escape his attachment to the sinful world and owes it
a certain allegiance, but . . . the demands of the world and the demands of
God are in inherent tension with one another. “[M]an is seen as subject to
two moralities, and as a citizen of two worlds that are not only
discontinuous with each other but largely opposed.” The only ultimate
resolution of this struggle is redemption through the death and
resurrection of Jesus. . . .”[T]he dualist joins the radical Christian in
pronouncing the whole world of human culture to be godless and sick
until death” . . . but “the dualist knows that he belongs to that culture and
cannot get out of it.”193
Lutheran church statements, by contrast, suggest that the Christian does not live
in the world as a person wishing but not able to escape his attachment, nor a person
who gives his allegiance to it grudgingly. A most recent Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America statement on the subject of church in society explains, “God does
not take the Church out of the world, but instead calls it to affirm and to enter more
deeply into the world. Although in bondage to sin and death, the world is God’s

189

The Freedom of a Christian, Lull, supra note 109, at 617-619, 674.

190

See, e.g., Braaten, supra note 71, at 34; ROBERT BENNE, THE PARADOXICAL VISION: A
PUBLIC THEOLOGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 82 (1995), Whether One May Flee from a Deadly
Plague, Lull, supra note 109, at 738-741.
191

See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.

192

See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.

193

McConnell, supra note 79, at 210 (quoting H. Richard Niebuhr, CHRIST AND CULTURE
(1951)).
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good creation, where, because of love, God in Jesus Christ became flesh.” 194 Yet,
paradoxically, “the presence and promise of God’s reign makes the church restless
and discontented with the world’s brokenness and violence. Acting for the sake of
God’s world requires resisting and struggling against the evils of the world.”195
The possibility of simultaneous conflicting loyalties does not appear often in the
jurisprudence of William Rehnquist. Those who have analyzed Justice Rehnquist’s
opinions at length note that as between individual or group rights and state/federal
law, Justice Rehnquist nearly always sides with the government.196 His strong
defense of private property is anomalous, an exception perhaps referencing his
political history rather than his jurisprudential views. Moreover, he nearly always
resolves federal-state conflicts in favor of the state.197 Indeed, some commentators
have described Justice Rehnquist’s role as very deferential to other branches of
government,198 though his recent advocacy on behalf of an independent bench raises
the question whether he is changing his views slightly.199
194
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, A Social Statement: The Church in Society:
A Lutheran Perspective 2 (August 28-September 4, 1991).
195

Id. at 3.

196

See, e.g., Davis, supra note 113, at 24; IRONS, supra note 13, at 51, 123; Zeppos, supra
note 113, at 680; Ronald W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). As suggested earlier, the one exception has
been in affirmative action cases, Savage, supra note 13, at 301.
197

Zeppos, supra note 113, at 680. Such deference is not always to rights-claimants’
disadvantage, where two rights-claimants are in a dispute. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v.
Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), where Rehnquist’s majority opinion found that
the federal court should have abstained from intervening in a sex discrimination case filed
against Dayton Christian schools by the state because of comity and federalism concerns. Id.
at 626-27. Johnson and Martinis also claim that Rehnquist favors the state over sovereign
Indian nations, which is truly an anomaly since states have been virtually excluded from
power over Indian tribes since Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Johnson &
Martinis, supra note 191, at 7-8, 18, 20-22. They also argue that Rehnquist has rejected
fundamental caselaw on issues such as federal trust responsibilities, Indian sovereignty, Indian
jurisdiction. Id. at 8-17.
198

See, e.g., Irons, supra note 13, at 63, 127; Savage, supra note 13, at 319 (describing
Justice Rehnquist’s view in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), that the
U.S. government need not follow Fourth Amendment protections for non-citizens; decisions
for the government in nearly all criminal cases). Such deference is reflected in his choice of
the lowest of the three levels of the rational basis test. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425-26 (1961) (“[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power. . . . A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it”); see, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 640-41
(1974)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 178
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)
(review of military regulations “far more deferential” than others; courts must give “great
deference” to the professional judgment of military authorities regarding the importance of a
military interest); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“extremely great” deference due states on questions of economic legislation). Assistant
Attorney William Rehnquist noted that “‘Disobedience cannot be tolerated, whether it be
violent or nonviolent disobedience. . . . If force or the threat of force is required in order to
enforce the law, we must not shirk from its employment.’” Savage, supra note 13, at 40. Yet
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A particularly important subtext to Rehnquist’s theory on constitutional
interpretation is his emphasis on delegation. In his view, the Constitution delegates
specific and quite restricted powers to the federal branches—the executive, the
legislature and the federal judiciary—and reserves “the remaining authority normally
associated with sovereignty to the States and to the people in the States.” 200
Similarly, the judiciary’s duty is simply to prevent transgression of the other
branches’ authority boundaries, not to assess the wisdom of their actions.201 His
views on delegation and constitutional jurisdiction square with what at least one
reviewer of his work calls Rehnquist’s revival of “the long-absent doctrine of state
sovereignty,”202 discrediting “the conventional wisdom that there were virtually no
enforceable judicial limits on congressional power.”203 Indeed, he is one of the few
members of the Court who has attempted to keep alive the notion that the
Establishment Clause prohibits only national, not state, establishments of religion.204
Yet, Justice Rehnquist’s self-description of judges as “keepers of the covenant” is
probably a more accurate account of his own understanding of his jurisprudence.205
Rehnquist defines this covenant primarily as the promise of the federal branches of
government not to exceed the powers delegated to them. Indeed, he has been

he was apparently speaking only of individuals, as Rehnquist wrote that police and federal
agents could hold Vietnam War protesters indefinitely without charges, and suggested that the
executive branch, including the Army, could be trusted to “police itself” from abusing
constitutional rights. Id.
199

See, e.g., Rehnquist Unhappy with Planned Inquiry, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 1, 1996,
at 3A (warning against micromanagement of judicial system and need to protect judical
independence); David S. Broder, Space for a Judge, WASH. POST, April 4, 1996, at CO7
(chastising Senator Bob Dole and President Clinton for threatening a federal judge’s job after
a controversial decision); Rehnquist Warns on State of Court System, 14 NAT’L L.J. 5, Jan. 13,
1992, at col 1. Merrill disagrees with the standard wisdom on Rehnquist, noting that Justice
Rehnquist deferred to only about 64% of state agency interpretations, sometimes more and
sometimes less than the Court as a whole. Merrill, supra note 114, at 653-54. Oddly,
Rehnquist does not express the same deferential concerns when it comes to previous judicial
decisions through embrace of stare decisis. See Shapiro, supra note 114, at 290-91, 419;
Merrill, supra note 114, at 657-59.
200

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

201

See Davis, supra note 113, at 31.

202
D. DAVIS, supra note 13 at 20. Davis notes that when Rehnquist believes federal action
encroaches on the states’ authority, he is quick to use judicial review. Id. at 23-26.
203

D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 20. See, e.g., Rehnquist’s insistence that there is little
evidence that Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not intended “to override the
traditional sovereign immunity of the States.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1978).
204
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97-100 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Wallace represents a case in which Rehnquist makes a “cultural Christian” rather than a
public-private argument, as he does in other Establishment Clause cases at times, suggesting
that religion is part of the fabric of our culture. Id. at 97 passim.
205

William H. Rehnquist, supra note 3 at 698; D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 20. It is
interesting that Rehnquist would borrow covenantal language from some part of his history.
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scarcely deferential to Congress or the federal executive when they have violated the
sovereignty of states or their practical ability to govern.206
That covenant, however, does not recognize that judges may have conflicting
responsibilities to states, Congress and individuals at the same time. Indeed,
Rehnquist has worked to “dispel” the “cliche” that the Constitution is a charter that
guarantees rights to individuals against the government, rather than a balancing act
among all of the “players” in the constitutional system.207 In one study of his votes
between 1976 and 1981, Rehnquist sided with state governments in more than 80%
of all cases (compared with the majority at 52%); sided with criminal appellants in
only 12% of the cases (vs. majority which went for criminal defendants 41% of the
time); and held for First Amendment plaintiffs in 16% of cases (compared to the
majority’s 44%).208
One way to explain Justice Rehnquist’s state-sovereignism is to accept his selfunderstanding as Court prophet, calling other Justices back to the source of
constitutional power—the people—and the key notion of limited government. That
is, Rehnquist might be understood as rhetorically attempting to restore constitutional
balance209 by reminding us that the Constitution does not simply recognize the
individual and the federal government as the only constitutional actors or audience.
In Usery, for instance, Rehnquist asserts, “[A] state is not merely a factor in the
‘shifting economic arrangements’ in the private sector of the economy, . . . but is
itself a coordinate element in the system established by the framers for governing our
Federal Union.”210 And in “The Notion of a Living Constitution,” he points out:
The people are the ultimate source of authority. . . .They have granted
some authority to the federal government and have reserved authority not
granted it to the states or to the people individually. As between the
branches of the federal government, the people have given certain
206

D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 19-21.

207

Davis, supra note 113, at 41 (citing William H. Rehnquist, Government by Cliche, 45
MO. L. REV. 379 (1980)). An unvarnished view of how Rehnquist may view individuals who
dissent from government demands may be his response to anti-war protesters during the
Vietnam era, when he aligned all of the left with the Weathermen, claiming,”[t]he very notion
of law and of a government of law is presently under attack from a new group of barbarians.
Just as the Barbarians who invaded the Roman Empire neither knew or cared about Roman
government and law, these new barbarians care nothing for our system of government and
law. They believe that the relatively civilized society in which they live is so totally rotten
that no remedy short of the destruction of that society will suffice.” Irons, supra note 13, at
51-52; Savage, supra note 13, at 39-40.
208
IRONS, supra note 13, at 63. In Free Exercise cases, Rehnquist has nearly always voted
against the claimant as well. See SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 322. One survey notes that
Rehnquist has voted with Scalia and Thomas 83% of the time since they have been on the
court. Joan Biskupic, Balance of Power, WASH. POST, July 5, 1996, at A13.
209

Clor, supra note 132, at 561 (quoting REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT at 317-18).

210

Davis, supra note 113, at 33 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
849 (1976) (citations omitted)). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist points out that power is also
reserved to the people, although he does not pursue what that might mean apart from his
presumption that the people vest their power in the first instance in the legislation and agency
of state government.
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authority to the President, certain authority to Congress, and certain
authority to the federal judiciary. . . .Marshall said that if the popular
branches of government . . . are operating within the authority granted to
them by the Constitution, their judgment and not that of the Court must
obviously prevail.211
Indeed, Rehnquist is keen on restoring respect for states’ discretion, even in joint
federal-state projects. For example, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,212 Justice
Rehnquist dissents from the majority’s holding that Congress’ requirement that
Medicaid-granting states pay reasonable and adequate fees to medical providers
means that findings on those fees must be correct, arguing: “[T]he Court’s
suggestion that the States would deliberately disregard the requirements of the statute
ignores the Secretary’s oversight incorporated into the statute and does less than
justice to the States.”213
Rehnquist’s “keepers of the covenant” dissents might be superficially understood
as implementing a Lutheran doctrine of orders, “the common structures of human
existence, the indispensable conditions of the possibility of social life.”214 In the
Lutheran understanding, God has provided certain social arrangements or
organizations, which are “prior to and apart from belief in Christ,” that ensure our
care.215 In his time, Luther identified the church, the state, and the household
(oeconomia) as these orders,216 although Lutheranism has recognized that other
divinely given orders come into being as human needs and communities changed.217
Although these orders function “apart from and in tension with the Christian
revelation,” Lutherans have consistently understood that, as an order, the state
exercises its rightful power or role in restraining evil and in nurturing good,218 and
the branches of government use their distinctive competences toward this end.
Luther spoke to the special vocation of magistrates to “punish evil and protect the
good” as God’s servants and “workmen.”219 For a judge who serves within such an
order to have a God-given vocation to fulfill a need in forming and securing human
community requires both humility about the limits of one’s competence and
jurisdiction. It also requires support for the callings of others and the role of the
different orders in the securing of a just and humane future.
211

Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 696.

212

496 U.S. 498 (1990) (challenge by a nonprofit association of public and private
hospitals to Medicaid reimbursement rates; the Court determined that providers have a cause
of action, under the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, if states fail to adopt reasonable
and adequate rates).
213

Id. at 528 (Rehnquist, dissenting).

214

Braaten, supra note 71, at 34.

215

Id. at 32.

216

Id.

217

STRIETER, supra note 73, at 193-96 (discussing views of Robert Bertram and Edward
Schroeder).
218

Id. at 32.

219

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 674.
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A Lutheran doctrine of vocation can be borrowed analogically into a philosophy
of judicial restraint or balance of judicial power with the responsibilities of other
branches of government and individuals in securing these goods. Indeed, Luther
himself understood that conflicting interests and peoples would tend to check both
each other and the power of the rulers.220 If there is no political authority to
overbalance judicial interpretation of public values and call the intellectual blindness
or stubbornness of the judiciary to account, the Lutheran understanding of a bound
heart and mind would counsel for institutional self-restraint, and for a willing ear to
the judgments of other authorities.221
However, the thorough-goingness of Rehnquist’s commitment to state power and
state rights, even in those cases when the balance of power does not appear
threatened by individual rights or federal governmental action, suggests that his
commitment to so-called “state’s rights” is more than a corrective to a power
imbalance, which would be called for by a Lutheran understanding. Ironically, given
his deep skepticism about individual plaintiffs, Rehnquist sometimes take umbrage at
judges or litigants who question the motivations and actions of those with authority.
In his view, for instance, the Court should not question the motivations of state
officials,222 prison officials,223 employers,224 or schoolteachers;225 and should nearly
always balance equities in favor of the state rather than the individual.226 Rehnquist’s
distrust of outsiders and his strong alliance with authority figures seems at least
somewhat incompatible with Lutheran doctrine that simultaneously recognizes the
giftedness of authority and the fallenness of all (including the most powerful), which
places conflicting demands upon the lawmaker.
220

FORELL et al., supra note 174, at 38-39.

221

Forell, Luther’s Theology and Domestic Politics in MARTIN LUTHER: THEOLOGIAN OF
supra note 108, at 38-39.

THE CHURCH,
222

In commenting on an NAACP challenge to Texas’ all-white primaries, young clerk
Rehnquist noted that he took a “dim view of this pathological search for discrimination.”
SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 37; see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983) (Rehnquist
brushes past the problematic question whether state officials need to make a decision that
textbooks are secular or religious).
223

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

224

See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (Rehnquist defends employers against what he believes is the majority’s
suspicion that they coerce or maneuver injured workers into selecting a favorable jurisdiction
for worker’s compensation claims).
225
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 401 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (invalidation of shared time and community education programs in parochial
schools “impugns the integrity of public school teachers . . . assumed to be eager inculcators
of religious dogma . . . [and] . . . requiring ‘ongoing inspection’” (quoting Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985)).
226

For instance, Rehnquist concluded that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
would be irreparably injured if she were required to make $2.6 million in AFDC payments
with little hope of recouping the money if she lost in litigation, while the welfare clients
disputing her calculation of their income countable to reduce their welfare benefits can always
collect the back AFDC payments due them if they ultimately win. Heckler v. Turner, 468 U.S.
1305, 1307-08 (1984).
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Similarly, Rehnquist employs legal metaphors which preclude even selfcriticism. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, for instance,
Rehnquist responds to the Krishnas’ religious practice of sankirtan in the airport
using the metaphor of government as a proprietor, “managing its internal
operations” when it controls public property rather than a rights-balancing
approach.227 Yet the proprietor metaphor only makes sense in a system in which the
government’s power and rights must be unrestrained, rather than part of a balance
that includes the speaker’s rights and other individual harms, such as passengers’
need to “decide whether or not to contribute,” to the cause of their solicitors.228
Rehnquist often explains his reliance on state legislatures as the key players in
democratic decision-making by suggesting that the state is located closest to true
democracy, or the will of the people.229 Moreover, he credits the states as the location
in which the response to context might be taken most seriously, or as he says, the
place where the problems of the future are to be solved.230 In his view, judicial
review with national standards simply will “smother a healthy pluralism.”231 At other
times, he has suggested that his preference for state sovereignty is simply realistic:
whatever the Court may say about rights, in the long run the majority will have its
way, so there is no use in the Court’s attempting to thwart the majority will.232 Fiss
and Krauthammer give a third interpretation: they locate the center of power for
Rehnquist closer to the individual, describing Rehnquist’s state power focus as an

227

See International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992). Moreover, Rehnquist takes a strict approach to finding a dedication of property for
speech purposes, noting the need for evidence that the government is “intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse” and that it is not a “special enclave.” Id. at 680
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
Rehnquist even accuses the Krishnas of shady dealings; their organization “attempt[s] to
circumvent” the history and practice of airport activity by “blithely equat[ing]” it to bus and
train stations, and boat wharves. Id. at 681-82.
228

Id. at 683 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (1990)). Rehnquist’s
opinion also equates the Krishnas with “the skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor [who] can
target the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering physical
impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation. . . . The unsavory solicitor can also
commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate efforts to
shortchange those who agree to purchase.” Id. at 684.
229

Davis, supra note 113, at 24. States similarly are arguably potentially more accountable
to a public than judges, Davis, supra note 113, at 16, or national legislatures. Davis, supra
note 113, at 24. Macey notes, however, that Rehnquist seems sensitive to the problems of
“interest groups in the judicial process” while ignoring these same problems in the legislative
process. Macey, supra note 137, at 592.
230
Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 699-700. Davis notes that Rehnquist’s democratic focus
may seem inconsistent with his record on free speech, where he gets marks for supporting
protection of speech claimants in fewer cases than any other Justice, perhaps because he has
expressed disagreement with incorporation of the Speech Clause to regulate states. Davis,
supra note 113, at 70-73. In fact, Rehnquist has not sided with the speech claimant even when
he also asserted a property rights claim, i.e., ownership of a flag or license plate. Id. at 73-75.
231

Id. at 44-45 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980)).

232

See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 36.
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attempt to be consistent with laissez-faire theory “which reduces the function of
government to protecting private exchanges and the aim of the Constitution to
protecting the rights and expectations of property holders.”233
Whether Rehnquist’s views are simply state-sovereignist, motivated by a belief in
the popular will, or ultimately individualistic, as a consistent ideology (rather than a
constraining voice), they seem inconsistent with a Lutheran understanding of orders
or vocation. In the Lutheran view, institutions no less than human beings must
constantly be challenged and corrected, for as human creations, they are as apt to fall
into error and even perversion of their original purposes as any person. Luther
recognized that each of the orders—oeconomia, the church, and even the state—can
be both fruitful and perverse at the same time.234
Second, the freedom which God gives in the orders, including the states, permits
human sinfulness, so that democratic acts are as likely to be an expression of
individual self-interest as those of tyrants or even judges.235 Similarly, in the
Lutheran view, even democratic authority can be exercised with blindness as well as
insight, with the self-delusion that one is working for the common good when one is
merely perpetuating evil.236 Indeed, from a conscience perspective, as deTocqueville
recognized early, popular sentiment can be as tyrannical and can suppress individual
judgment just as any other authoritarian scheme, and the whim of the majority tends
to replace the demand of king or tyrant in a democratic society.237
Yet, Rehnquist’s preference for legislative actions suggests a presumption of
correctness simply because they are authorized by the people. For instance, in
Furman v. Georgia, he suggests that if a legislative body makes a mistake, the only
repercussion is that a majority will is left in place; if a judicial body does so, the
view of nine Justices is imposed upon an entire public.238 Such a justification of state
acts on the basis of popular will rejects the insight that “there is no authority except
from God; the authority which everywhere exists has been ordained by God,”239 so

233
Davis, supra note 113, at 73 (quoting Owen Fiss & Charles Krauthammer, The
Rehnquist Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14, 21 (1982)). But see Macey, supra note
133, at 586-89 (arguing that Rehnquist has failed to “check legislative excess” in favor of
deference).
234

See Braaten, supra note 71, at 34.

235

Smith notes, “Henry David Thoreau, however, was hardly the only human being for
whom it was not self-evident that a group acquires moral authority to command merely by
virtue of numerical superiority.” Smith, supra note 17, at 592.
236

See Macey, supra note 137, at 578-86 (describing how the Founders separated powers
to check public interest group pressures).
237
ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 11-13 (Francis Bowen ed. & Henry
Reeve, trans., Vintage, 1995)
238

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467-70(1972). See characterization in Davis, supra
note 113, at 25.
239

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 659-60.
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that democracy itself can never be an ultimate justification. Taken to its ultimate
extreme, such a view, expressed as vox populi vox dei, is idolatrous.240
Thus, Lutheranism has incorporated the responsibility of challenge to the evil
done by the state as well as recognition of its authority. A Lutheran is called to be at
once obedient to and skeptical of authority, even that of a duly constituted
government, though Lutherans have described the formula in which obedience and
resistance are related in different ways.241 Yet, Rehnquist has missed this insight into
the possible evil of majoritarianism throughout his life, from his early political days
when he argued against a Phoenix civil rights ordinance because the majority was
“‘well satisfied with the traditional . . . system’ and did not want it ‘tinkered with’ by
‘social theorists’ who asserted a ‘claim for special privileges’ by the black
minority.”242 In fact, in his perhaps most infamous professional opinion, arguing that
his judge, Justice Jackson, should vote to uphold Plessy v. Ferguson,243 he claimed,
“[t]o the arguments made by Marshall that a majority may not deprive a minority of
its constitutional right, the answer must be made that while this is sound in theory, in
the long run it is the majority who will determine what the constitutional rights of the
minority are.”244
Justice Rehnquist’s statist-majoritarian thrust can be explained by his
commitment to legal positivism, i.e., the belief that no moral critique is available to
substantiate the propriety of particular legislation.245 Rehnquist’s particular brand of
positivism incorporates the separation of private and public values. Though he
240
I owe Howard Lesnick for this insight. As Howard points out, the “popular will” can be
heavily influenced by powerful elite interests, e.g., through heavy financing of political
campaigns. Letter from Howard Lesnick (May, 1997) (on file with author).
241

Strieter, for instance, describes four American Lutheran responsive models as the
“participatory reform-resistance type” taken by William Lazareth and George Forell; the
“christological-trinitarian” model preferred by Franklin Sherman and Larry Rasmussen, the
“confessing movement” response of Robert Bertram and Edward Schroeder, and Carl Braaten
and Robert Jenson’s “historical eschatological type.” STRIETER, supra note 73, at 3.
242

IRONS, supra note 13, at 50 (quoting Rehnquist’s 1967 letter to the editor published in
the Arizona Republic).
243

163 U.S. 536 (1896)(holding that “separate but equal” accommodations on public
transportation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
244
Rehnquist continued “One hundred and fifty years of attempts on the part of this Court
to protect minority rights of any kind—whether those of business, slaveholders, or Jehovah’s
Witnesses—have all met the same fate. One by one the cases establishing such rights have
been sloughed off, and crept silently to rest. If the present court is unable to profit by this
example, it must be prepared to see its work fade in time, too, as embodying only the
sentiments of a transient majority of nine men. . . .I realize that it is an unpopular and
unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues but I think
Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed.” SAVAGE, supra note 13 at 36. In a
now-infamous blemish on his moral character, in his confirmation hearings, Rehnquist
attempted to disavow this statement, claiming it represented Justice Jackson’s views rather
than his own, though Jackson’s secretary repudiated this account as “incredible on its face.”
Irons, supra note 13, at 60-61; see also Savage, supra note 13, at 35-38; D. Davis, supra note
13, at 7.
245

Davis, supra note 113, at 26-27.
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sometimes advocates that individuals act on the basis of their moral beliefs, “the
most common and most powerful wellsprings of action,” they cannot demand that
others join them, for public values are validated only by the will of the people whom
one can convince to vote the same way. 246 Rehnquist’s acceptance of the notion that
conscientious decisions, like property decisions, are “personal” is (ironically for a
state-sovereignist) streaked with a little autonomy ideology, which may also explain
his strong defense of private property. He once wrote, “‘[i]mplicit in each of our
daily lives is the reliance on our right to act as we choose in areas not proscribed by
law, and reliance that the law will be enforced against those who wrongfully
interfere with this exercise of freedom on our part.’“247 Yet, Rehnquist has written
that it would not be immoral or improper to repeat the entire Bill of Rights, since its
“trump” value lies in its majoritarian source.248
Rehnquist’s own positivist views have been held since early adulthood, as
evidenced by his Stanford Daily editorial that opined, “‘moral standards are
incapable of being rationally demonstrated’ . . . it ‘is logically impossible to weigh
the merits of one of these emotions [about whether German officers should be
allowed to speak on campus] against the other. . . . [O]ne personal conviction is no
better than another.’“249 That these views are part of his judicial philosophy is
demonstrated in his definitive “The Notion of a Living Constitution,” which
castigates non-interpretivist judges:
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no
basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as
a platform for the launching of moral judgments.
There is no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you
that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your
conscience, and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel strongly and
deeply about our own moral judgments, but they remain only personal
moral judgments until in some way given the sanction of law. . . .
I know of no other method compatible with political theory basic to
democratic society by which one’s own conscientious belief may be

246

See, e.g.,Rehnquist, supra note 3 at 704-706; see also Davis, supra note 113, at 26-27
(describing positivism as “moral relativism”); Clor, supra note 132, at 563 (describing
Rehnquist’s views as “legal positivism with a vengeance,” in which justice cannot precede
law).
247
IRONS, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis added). A judicial example is Patterson v.
McLean Credit, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), in which Justice Rehnquist initially wanted to write an
opinion determining that the Civil Rights statute on discriminatory contracts, 42 U.S.C. §
1981, should not be made applicable to private employers. Savage, supra note 13, at 190.
248
Merrill, supra note 114, at 633 (citing William H. Rehnquist, Government by Cliche, 45
MO. L. REV. 379, 390-92 (1980)).
249

IRONS, supra note 13, at 48 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Emotion vs. Reason,
STANFORD DAILY (editorial)) (emphasis added).
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translated into positive law and thereby obtain the only general moral
imprimatur permissible in a pluralistic, democratic society.250
Justice Rehnquist specifically disavows that laws are generally accepted “because
of any intrinsic worth [or] because of any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural
justice. [I]nstead [they are accepted] simply because they have been incorporated in a
constitution by the people.”251 Indeed, Rehnquist quotes Holmes approvingly for
skepticism about natural law arguments;252 and rarely recites a moral argument in
support of a state’s position.253
Rehnquist’s positivism and his consignment of moral questions to the private
sphere unless they can obtain the assent of a majority represents a complete
disavowal of the Lutheran position that natural law ultimately trumps positive law.254.
Of course, Lutheran doctrine simultaneously recognizes the office of the authority
and the responsibility to honor those who hold the office, even to the point of
refusing rebellion.255 However, nothing about Lutheran doctrine suggests that
Christians should be quiet in the face of evil or even neglect by those who exercise
their office. In fact, Luther himself never used any excuse of office or jurisdiction to
avoid castigating the rulers of his own time:
The temporal lords are supposed to govern lands and people outwardly.
This they leave undone. They can do no more than strip and fleece, heap
tax upon tax and tribute upon tribute, letting loose here a bear and there a
wolf. Besides this, there is no justice, integrity, or truth to be found
among them. They behave worse than any thief or scoundrel, and their
temporal rule has sunk quite as low as that of the spiritual tyrants.256
Yet Rehnquist’s state-sovereignist conception of government leaves little or no
room for institutional challenge or epideictic criticism of office-holders, or claims
that law or public policy is based on the tyranny of self-interested public will or the
fallen institutional judgment of parallel lawmakers. Rehnquist’s view of the Court’s
ability to challenge is simply jurisdictional: it is only when “these branches overstep
the authority given them by the Constitution . . . or invade protected individual
rights” that “the Court must prefer the Constitution to the government acts.”257

250

Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 704, 705.

251

Id. at 704; IRONS, supra note 13, at 32.

252

Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 704-05.

253

A notable exception is New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, in which
Justice Rehnquist argues that the state could logically conclude that it should enforce
traditional “family values” by subsidizing intact families with married spouses and excluding
parents who live together without benefit of marriage and their children from welfare benefits.
411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
254

Clor, supra note 132, at 564 (noting Rehnquist’s fondness for quoting Justice Holmes
who debunks natural law and other claims that there is a right or goods).
255

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 668-69.

256

Id. at 683.

257

Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 696.
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By contrast, a Lutheran jurist would be bound to morally criticize the state for its
substantive failures, not simply its failure to observe its own jurisdictional limits or
promises. Even a Lutheran jurist who believed that jurisdiction is an expression of
the orders, a manifestation of God’s will for each of the three branches of
government, would feel obliged to exercise his epideictic authority to call the other
branches to account.
Justice Rehnquist steadfastly refuses to acknowledge this responsibility. As one
example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,258 Justice Rehnquist refuses
to say, with the majority, that the democratic decision of the people of Cleburne to
ban a half-way house for mentally retarded people is the product of fear, ignorance,
distaste, and dislike of retarded people.259 Even a Lutheran Justice who was
committed to an expansive view of the responsibility of a democratically chosen
legislative body to decide even wrongly, even a Justice who thought that a Court
opinion was likely to have no useful effect,260 would feel bound to denounce
decisions based on ignorance and resentment. Thus, even if Justice Rehnquist were
right in challenging a more rigorous “rational basis” application in City of Cleburne,
he is not excused from admitting rather than avoiding the basis for the City’s
decision.
Moreover, contrary to the natural law tradition accepted by Lutherans, which
posits a moral order given by God through human institutions, Rehnquist’s thoroughgoing positivism claims that no moral critique is available to judge the actions of
either individual or government, whether democratic or not. Rehnquist treats moral
decisions as appropriate only to the “private sphere,” refusing to acknowledge the
public dimensions of moral choice as natural law and Lutheran doctrine assume.
When Eddie Thomas calls on the state to grant him unemployment compensation
because he conscientiously refuses to work on gun turrets, Rehnquist suggests that
such decisions may well be “purely ‘personal philosophical’“ or “personal
subjective” ones, not demanding state protection.261
In accepting the public/private divide, Justice Rehnquist neglects the Lutheran
insight that it is possible to have simultaneous conflicting commitments. The publicprivate metaphor, which imagines human beings shuttling back and forth between

258

473 U.S. 432 (1985).

259

Rehnquist does exercise an epideictic role sometimes; a rare case where it was
exercised “against” the decision was in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988),
where Rehnquist’s opinion excoriated Hustler’s cartoon while upholding it under the First
Amendment. See SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 162.
260
See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 32 (quoting Rehnquist’s 1964 letter to the editor
published in the Arizona Republic) (describing attorney Rehnquist’s view that public
accommodations laws would only result in blacks and property owners “glowering at one
another across the lunch counter”); id. at 77 (quoting clerk Rehnquist’s memo that indicated,
“It is about time the Court faced the fact that the white people of the South don’t like the
colored people: the constitution . . . most assuredly did not appoint the Court as a sociological
watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head.”);
Larisa, supra note 151, at 208 (quoting author Rehnquist’s opinion, as stated in his book THE
SUPREME COURT (1987), that Court challenge to legislative majority decisions set the Court
“in the process of sowing a wind, with the whirlwind to be reaped years later”).
261

Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec Div, 450 U.S. 707, 723 (1981).
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their private lives and public lives, suggests that private matters are beyond public
reach or critique, while public matters are fully subject to scrutiny, discussion and
regulation by the community. Thus, sexuality (and its manifestations, such as
viewing pornography, selecting a sexual partner, choosing whether to procreate or
not) is out of bounds for moral conversation or legal constraint so long as it stays in a
private space; once it becomes public (adult movie theaters, public nudity, a request
for public funding for an abortion), the individual is at the moral and legal mercy of
the community. Or pollution of the earth cannot be questioned when it affects only
one’s “private” property, but once it has the potential to affect public concerns, it is
up for the highest scrutiny.
In the McConnell typology, Church Apart from Culture or Church in Conflict
with Culture groups would tend to accept the private-public split as perhaps a
necessary evil, and thus the legal implications I have described.262 Churches Aligned
with Culture groups might tend to refuse to accept the split (or substantially narrow
the private sphere), and determine that most aspects of one’s life are potentially the
subject of government regulation, so that private morality, communications and
actions could be regulated by the whole except for good reasons.263
By contrast, analogizing from the Lutheran understanding, the debate over the
line between private and public can be substantially reframed if one understands the
human being to be simultaneously committed to the conflicting demands of the
relationships in which she lives, with family, friends, local community, and nationstate. The line between private and public becomes meaningless, because the
relevant metaphor is relational, not spatial. The tensions between such relations, and
the structures in which the human is placed, cannot be resolved by reference to a
black-letter command of the Bible, nor “locating” one’s activity in the private or
public.
Indeed, even the priority of relationship (with God as first) does not resolve the
tension of conflicting demands between one’s proper loyalties. That priority merely
puts such demands in proper perspective: these simultaneous conflicting demands
are not ultimate demands on the self.264 And they are most likely infected with sin
and resolvable only in brokenness—that is, with unwarranted pain to one or more of
the demandants. But resolution of those demands, even through a legal rule or
decision, is ultimately not a matter of salvation, either for the self or for the world.
To give just one example, the question whether the state may enter Michael
Hardwick’s partially open bedroom and arrest him for sodomy,265 or confiscate
Stanley’s pornographic pictures266 does not, in the Lutheran understanding,
intrinsically come down to the question about where the spatial line between private
and public is drawn. Even if one made a practical argument on Lutheran grounds that
some clear boundaries for state intervention must be established by law, a Lutheran
would not conceptualize the problem in “property line” terms.

262

See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.

263

See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.

264

See Braaten, supra note 71, at 35.

265

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

266

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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Rather, a Lutheran would understand the moral problem as one of conflicting
loyalties, to the individual person, the intimate relationships that might be involved,
the community of friends in which Hardwick or Stanley lived, the larger community,
and the state. To give the “right” to Hardwick or Stanley or to give power to the
state is to take moral action which is always burdened with fallenness and
responsibility for the actor and for those around him. Nothing about Lutheran
theology reflects the understanding that moral decisions (whether Hardwick’s or
Attorney General Bowers’) are personal and autonomous; moral action is always
responsive rather than autonomous, responsive to God, to the community, and to the
neighbor.
C. The Equality of Authority: The Problem of Majoritarianism, Equal Protection
and Individual Rights
A Lutheran View: Love for the neighbor, rightly understood, is the sole basis for
ethical action, for both individuals and the government. It is both the demand of the
natural law and the response of freedom in the gift of God’s love and salvation.267
Thus, love is expressed in wrath and in care.
If there is one dramatic way in which Rehnquist’s jurisprudence departs from
Lutheran theology, it is in a thorough lack of rhetorical concern for the neighbor.
Concern for the neighbor is theologically based for Lutherans, for it is justified not
by the worthiness of the neighbor nor by emphasis on moral self-improvement as a
path to human self-fulfillment or eudamonia, but on what God has done for the giver.
Yet, the premise that neighbor-love is responsive to God’s love need not be the
predicate of a claim that government must act both responsively and realistically
about the neighbor’s need.
Lutheranism’s lifting up of care of the neighbor, including defense of the
neighbor against evil even at the risk of grave loss or death to oneself,268 is perhaps
its most remarkable aspect given Lutheran acknowledgement of the inherent
sinfulness of both the neighbor and the self. Normally, a “logical” corollary to the
recognition of human self-interest would be that government should be framed to
account for that self-interest, not in contradiction to it. Yet, the Lutheran mandate to
care for the neighbor is realistic about, and willing to denounce, the neighbor’s flaws
and wrongdoing, while it does not justify disengagement or turning away from the
neighbor who exhibits those flaws. Rather, for the Lutherans, Christians must give
their lives even for those who are most unworthy in conventional terms.269
This seemingly contradictory stance of judgment and love can be explained, in
part, by the metaphor of the two governances. The Lutheran concern for the
neighbor is at once a demand of both kingdoms, the kingdom of God where
neighbor-love is responsive to God and the other, and the kingdom of the world,
where the responsibility to care for the neighbor is built into the fabric of natural law.
From natural law, all persons, whether or not Christian, discern the principles of
justice and respect for human persons; and can describe a ground for human
interaction that both prescribes and exhorts care for the neighbor, justifying the
267

See FORELL, supra note 174, at 100-105; discussion by Robert Benne, The Lutheran
Tradition and Public Theology, Lutheran Theological Seminary Bulletin 19-20 (Fall 1995).
268

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 738-43.

269

FORELL, supra note 174, at 98-101, 103-104.
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restraint and punishment of those who evilly transgress those boundaries.270 The
Christian will, in Luther’s view, exceed his duties under natural law principles of
judgment and obligation out of gratitude and responsive love to the Creator.271
Perhaps the most critical misinterpretation of Lutheran texts for our purposes is
the equation of the restraining and judging function of the law with natural justice,
and the nurturing and sacrificial response of human beings with the Gospel. In fact,
Luther and his successors have underscored that natural law, and positive law as
reformed by natural principles of justice, must be understood as having an
affirmative role in helping and supporting the neighbor;272 that task is not consigned
only to Christians. Thus, even the godless judge or magistrate may be called to
account if he does not exercise the “fatherly” responsibilities he has to see for the
care of those who are particularly vulnerable.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinions contain little evidence that he understands the
distinction between disciplined love and lack of concern for the neighbor. The
epideictic text of Rehnquist’s opinions toward those individuals entreating the
government can only be described as turning his back, whether it is to the
conscientious claims of individuals challenging the state,273 or claims of need from
the vulnerable.274 Rehnquist’s steadfast refusal to challenge any state action against
vulnerable people, however ill-motivated, is one example. When Congress
attempted to get at “hippie communes” by refusing food stamps to unrelated people
who lived in the same household in U.S.D.A. v. Moreno,275 Rehnquist recognized the
possible unfortunate consequence of the law,276 although he would not talk about
Jacinto Moreno, the plaintiff, directly. Yet he pronounced, “our role is limited to the
determination of whether there is any rational basis” for denying food stamps.277
Since the government could “conceivably” have thought that the regulation would
270

See Braaten, supra note 71, at 33-34.

271

See FAITH ACTIVE IN LOVE, supra note 174, at 86-88, 110-111; On Temporal Authority,
Lull, supra note 109, at 668-69.
272

Id. at 663, 668-69.

273
IRONS, supra note 13, at 52 (quoting Rehnquist’s view that the conscientious objector
owes an “unqualified obligation to obey a duly enacted law” and “does not fully atone” for his
disobedience’” by serving his sentence). In the Justice Department, Rehnquist referred to
Vietnam protesters, for instance, as the “new barbarians.” Id. at 51; SAVAGE supra note 13, at
40.
274

See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 362 (“[w]here Brennan saw the best in the lowest
of human beings, Rehnquist saw murderers, thieves and thugs”); Culp, supra note 172, at 609
(calling Rehnquist “the most hostile justice toward claims of civil rights in this half century
and . . . perhaps ever”); Phelps & Gates, supra note 114, at 572 (quoting Edward V. Heck,
Civil Liberties Voting Patterns in the Burger Court, 1975-1978, 34 W. Pol. Q. 193, 202
(1981), who states that “Rehnquist’s ‘voting record . . . is characterized by almost unstinting
hostility to the assertion of civil liberties claims’“).
275
413 U.S. 528 (1973). Justice Brennan labeled these regulations a punishment for “only
those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their
living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.” Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
276

Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

277

Id. at 545-46; see also IRONS, supra note 13, at 17-18.
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deny stamps to those households “which have been formed solely for the purpose of
taking advantage of the food stamp program” (although no legislative history
supported this conception), the statute could not be attacked.278
Regularly, Rehnquist also implicitly refers to the “neighbor” who calls upon the
state for assistance as a troublemaker, suggesting deep skepticism about the
willingness of individual rights claimants to cheat the government. More than
Lutheran realism about human nature, both its good and evil, he expresses
unremitting disdain for the character or situation in which such people find
themselves. For instance, in response to Eddie Thomas, the conscientious factory
worker, he argues that granting benefits to people who refuse to do morally
repugnant work based on “purely ‘personal philosophical choices’“ will mean that
“[p]ersons will then be able to quit their jobs, assert[ing] they did so for personal
reasons, and collect unemployment insurance.”279 Similarly, Fred Cruz, who
demands the right to hold services with state assistance and for equal consideration
of his religious activity in parole hearings, is met with some scorn: “The inmate
stands to gain something and lose nothing from a complaint stating facts that he is
ultimately unable to prove. Though he may be denied legal relief, he will
nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse.”280
Such skepticism is not reserved only for religious claimants, however. Justice
Rehnquist also suspects the motives of unconventional claimants, such as resident
aliens whom he thinks will not apply for citizenship and will try to take advantage of
278

Moreno, 413 U.S. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

279

Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 723 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist puts Thomas’ reason for refusing to make war instruments in the same category as
“every personal subjective reason for leaving a job.” Id.
280

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed,
Rehnquist goes so far as to cite a prisoner account that writ-writers in prison are essentially
con artists who rip off their “clients” and try to snow the courts with fantastic causes of action
and fake citations. Id. at 327 n.7; Charles Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CAL.
L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1968). Whatever the truth of the article, its relevance to Fred Cruz’s
request for a hearing on his claim that Buddhists were being treated unequally in the prisons is
a stretch.
See also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986), where Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, overturns a lower court’s mandate that an employer who
cannot demonstrate hardship must offer the employee’s preferred accommodation of his
religious beliefs instead of the employer’s offer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The claimant, Ronald Philbrook, a Worldwide Church of God
believer, asked the school board to permit him to use authorized personal leave for required
religious observances (which was prohibited) instead of taking unpaid, unauthorized leave or
scheduling medical leave on the same day. Id. at 62, 64-65. Rehnquist noted that under the
employee preference rule, “the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most
beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of
the conflict.” Id. at 69. Of course, Rehnquist holds no brief for secularists, either, noting that
the First Amendment does not require the “extreme approach” of throwing the Court’s
“weight on the side of those who believe that our society as a whole should be a purely secular
one.” Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
Rehnquist quotes approvingly from Justice Douglas’ famous Zorach v. Clauson language that
begins, “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” 343 U.S.
306, 313-314 (1952). Id.
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the state;281 or ones he believes may come from a bribe-taking country or have a
contemptuous attitude toward public service.282 Families involving unmarried
couples, particularly women and their children, are another group that has come in
for Rehnquist’s disapproval. For instance, he wanted to uphold a rule denying
benefits to children of unmarried parents, because “[t]he Constitution does not
require that special financial assistance designed by the legislature to help poor
families be extended to ‘communes’ as well.”283
Indeed, Rehnquist suspects fraud in a vast number of claimants: speaking on
Congress’ refusal to give some illegitimate children their father’s Social Security
benefits, he described it as an appropriate “effort[] to cope with spurious claims of
entitlement, while preserving maximum benefits for those persons mostly likely to
be deserving. . . .”284 Even in Medicare claims, Rehnquist is suspicious: he notes that
permitting Medicare claimants to come directly to federal court instead of the
administrative hearing system will mean litigation by many a person who thinks
“someday he might wish to have some kind of surgery.”285 Rehnquist adds, “it is of
no great moment to the dissent that after [such litigation] that individual may simply
abandon his musings about having surgery.”286

281

Rehnquist acknowledges the state’s right to assume that aliens are unlikely to stay in the
United States and “contribute to the future well-being of the State.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from holding that New York’s refusal
to provide resident aliens with higher education financial assistance because they refused to
apply for naturalization when they could, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
282

Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 662 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Irons
supra note 13, at 272-73.
283

New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 622 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see IRONS, supra note 13, at 282-84, noting that Rehnquist stood alone in his
consistent view that lawmakers can exclude illegitimate children from definitions of family.
He had already expressed the view, as an assistant attorney general, “that the ERA would be
‘almost certain to have an adverse effect on the family unit as we know it.’“ Id. at 298.
284

Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 638 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 289 (1979) (Rehnquist dismisses the claim
of an unmarried, live-in mother of a dead man’s child for mother’s Social Security benefit,
noting that the mother’s benefit was intended to protect the family unit by making the
surviving parent’s “choice to stay home easier.”). In Rehnquist’s view, however, it was not
meant as a “system for the dispensing of child-care subsidies” to women who were not
married to, and therefore didn’t have the expectation of support from, men by whom they had
children. Id. Moreover, Rehnquist compares the interest of these women’s illegitimate
children as comparable to “those who are gratified in a nonmaterial way to see a friend or
relative receive benefits.” Id. at 295.
285

Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 625 (1984).

286

Id. Surprisingly, Rehnquist goes on to admit that such a problem will be routine because
“millions of people, like Ringer, who desire some kind of controversial operation but who are
unable to have it because their surgeons will not perform the surgery without knowing in
advance [whether they will be paid].” Id. at 625. Yet, he is indignant at the thought “that
those individuals, as well as Ringer, are entitled to an advance declaration so as to ensure them
the opportunity to have the surgery they desire.” Id. at 626; see also Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U.S. 29, 46 (1979), where Rehnquist
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Even when he is not excoriating plaintiffs, Rehnquist’s opinions often evince a
flavor of indifference in the problems of people coming to court for relief.287 For
instance, he is a proponent of the position that unless government has placed an
“obstacle in the path of” a fundamental rights claimant, the government has not
violated her right;288 in abortion cases, he has refused to speak either in favor of the
fetus’ right to life or the mother’s right to privacy or liberty.289 Similarly, to Air
Force Captain/Rabbi Simcha Goldman’s plea that wearing his yarmulke is “silent
devotion akin to prayer” required by his religious belief, Rehnquist responds merely
that due to such rules, “military life may be more objectionable for petitioner and
probably others.”290
Of course, even Justice Rehnquist on occasion expresses concern for some
claimants, particularly when the state is faced with competing claims on limited
resources,291 though he favors those traditionally considered innocent and not
responsible for their own plight,292 such as elderly or disabled married women. Most
notably, in Califano v. Goldfarb, he cites the “plight of [dependent] widows [as]
especially severe,” justifying a presumption that widows are dependent on their
spouses, while widowers must prove their dependency to get Social Security
benefits.293 And in the majority opinion in Herweg v. Ray, he takes the unusual step
of talking about nursing home patient Elvina Herweg more personally,294 ultimately
upholding federal over state regulations in her favor.295
posits that maximum benefit limits for disabled workers’ families may have been retained “to
discourage feigned disability, a consideration wholly inapplicable to death benefits.”
287
Rehnquist has tirelessly worked to eliminate Death Row subsequent appeals, thinking
them wasteful and abusive of law enforcement. Savage, supra note 13, at 412; Culp, supra
note 168, at 603-04 (discussing the resurgence of disregard for the interests of AfricanAmericans with the Rehnquist Court).
288
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (quoting Harris v.
MacRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001 (1982)
(quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969)) (Rehnquist counters nursing home
residents’ pleas that they were in danger of losing their Medicaid payments because of
decisions that they should be transferred to a lower-level facility by saying that the threat was
“quite realistic,” yet not “of sufficient immediacy and reality” to justify their bringing the
lawsuit).
289

See SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 261.

290

Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986).

291

See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 278-79 (1974)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (newly resident poor compete with long-resident near-poor for free
medical care); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979) (providing Social Security to
unwed mother of deceased father’s child will reduce benefits to later married mother and her
children).
292

For instance, in Maricopa County Rehnquist expresses a preference for taxpaying longterm residents over new, poor residents; and in Boles, for the claims of the deceased’s wife
and her children over those of his previous live-in girlfriend and her children. Id.
293

430 U.S. 199, 232-33 (1976).

294

Rehnquist’s opinion notes “Petitioner Elvina Herweg has been in a comatose state since
August 1976 as a result of two cerebral hemorrhages.” Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 270
(1982). We also discover that Elvina’s husband, whose income is attributed to her, is a
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Lutheranism offers a different epideictic and deliberative approach to the
problem of equality of persons. Constitutionalists have had a difficult time framing a
theory that will deal with the facts of real life: that inequalities abound, from
maldistribution of material goods to social inequalities of birth that are unrelated to
inherent talents or virtues, to the life-contingencies which find otherwise equally
matched individuals in very unequal life circumstances. Justice Rehnquist’s
positivist approach recognizes existing inequities, but takes a no-moral-blame
approach that gives a rebuttable presumption of propriety to current social and
economic arrangements in any equality discussion. In such a laissez-faire view,
courts are not able nor responsible to deal with these inequalities of life, though they
should perhaps “call” the government on intentional government malice against
individuals if it is sufficiently obvious and grievous. Rehnquist’s approach contrasts
with others, for instance, the view that courts can respond to public inequalities, but
not to private ones,296 or the formal equality approach,297 which also selectively
defines cognizable inequalities according to various Equal Protection theories, such
as political powerlessness, or human autonomy.298 While in these formal (selective)
equality approaches, all real inequalities are not “seen” by the Court,299 radical
equality theory tends to “see” all inequalities and redistributes material possessions
to compensate for them.
butcher, and that they have three children at home. Id. One other case recognizing the needs
of the poor is Rehnquist’s dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985), where
Rehnquist dissents from invalidation of a public remedial education, clinical and guidance
service program in religious schools, arguing such aid is “sorely needed,” although the case
can be explained more by Rehnquist’s views on the Establishment Clause than on the role of
constitutional courts with respect to the poor.
295

Herweg, 455 U.S. at 278.

296

See, e.g., David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection
in a ‘Negative Citizenship’ Regime, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 9, 41-42 (1996). Advocates of
the public/private approach might call on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) to define
the “public” very narrowly to include only those participatory rights which are inherent in
democratic citizenship.
297

See discussion in Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is Colorblind, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1994).
298

Compare John Hart Ely, Policing the Process of Representation: The Court as Referee,
and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, in
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 3-23 (John H. Garvey & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, 3d ed. 1984).
299
I use the metaphor of vision because, ironically, Justice John Harlan’s pronouncement,
“our constitution is color-blind” kicks off the debate about equal protection in the last century.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting.) The constitutional
interpreter “sees” the criteria used to differentiate, and then pronounces that the Constitution
does not “see” it and therefore it cannot be used. If, however, the judge refuses to “see” the
criteria as a constitutional question, then the Constitution implicitly “sees” it as viable basis
for difference. Thus, a person who is denied a job because of her gender (an immutable
characteristic and/or historically a basis for creation of insular communities of women) has a
difference that the court “sees” and then (ironically) pronounces that the Constitution does not
“see;” but if a person is denied a job because of her pregnancy, that difference cannot be
“seen” by the court for purposes of adjudication (although her pregnancy can be “seen” by the
legislature).
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The problem with equality talk, however, is precisely in its selective vision: the
Court narrows its vision to those things jurists believe the Constitution permits them
to see, and disregards other inequalities in daily life, some of them disregarded
because they are viewed as necessary to sustain a capitalist democracy.300 The
Lutheran approach to the problem of inequality is to recognize it for what it is—a
given and yet corrupted aspect of living in this world.
Borrowing from ancient notions of station, Lutheranism recognizes the
assignment of status in this life both as a gift of God’s endowment of vocation upon
the individual and as the result of human greed for material possessions and
hierarchical power.301 As a gift of vocation, any particular status in the world—
whether one is a garbage hauler or a governor—contains the capacity for fulfillment
and the responsibility to do good.302 In that sense, all stations in life are “equal
opportunity” stations, capable of providing for human happiness, well-being, and
meaningful contribution. Authority, in the Lutheran understanding, becomes an
office, a responsibility, rather than a perquisite of a particular status which entitles
the holder to dangle the lives of human beings for his personal whims.303
Yet, as an assignment from a community formed by corrupt wills, any particular
status inherently contains the diminishment of the human person and involves
corrupt powerlust and resentment. In that sense, all stations in life participate in, and
subject their holders to, the very tangible evils that we commonly understand when
we talk about inequality in any of its versions: power or vulnerability in life and
death, human respect or its diminishment, safety or precariousness of daily existence,
material wellbeing or material hunger. People in different stations may not
participate in a precisely equal way in these evils, just as they may not participate in
a precisely equal way in goods, but they all participate significantly.
The Lutheran acknowledgement of the equally authorized stations of all persons
makes it possible for a jurist to recognize and probe the corruptions attendant on all
authority, and to expose them epideictically, even while affirming the authority itself
and even many of its decisions. Thus, unlike Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence,
where the government, once authorized to take care of public property, becomes its
“owner” and may use the property at its discretion, the Lutheran position recognizes
the simultaneous authority of the individual and the state to stewardship of that
property, and their common tendency to hoard it for their own purposes. Or, in the
refusal of treatment cases, Lutheran doctrine can recognize at the same time the
authority of a parent’s conscientious decisions about his child’s medical care, and the
state’s authority to care for its children, as well as simultaneously exposing the self300
Republican government, for instance, does not work unless the few represent the many,
unless there are presidents, Cabinet members, and agency heads. Capitalism does not work
unless there is a boss for every worker, rich people whom the poor can aspire to be if they
work hard, indeed poor people whom the rich must fear they will be if they don’t.
301

Braaten, supra note 71, at 34.

302
See The Freedom of a Christian, Lull, supra note 109, at 621; Braaten, supra note 71, at
34. Lutherans sometimes talk about the human agent as cooperator dei (cooperator with God).
According to Duchrow, for instance, Luther explained that works are not “good through a
person alone, but by acting in accordance with the office in which God has placed him.”
STRIETER, supra note 73, 46-48.
303

See, e.g., On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 692-94.
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delusion and self-interest of each in exercising that authority. In such an
understanding, individual rights do not “trump” majorities; nor do majorities
overwhelm the conscience of the individual before the courts.
Similarly, a Lutheran judge would take a different view of legislative outcomes
than existing policy positions, liberal or conservative.
Some liberals and
conservatives view government as potentially capable of making an impact on
human efforts to make progress toward perfection of human nature. For instance,
some “liberals” suggest that government can change work attitudes of non-working
welfare recipients simply by providing them with sufficient financial incentives to
escape their economic and social setting,304 while similar-thinking “conservatives”
suggest that the government should withdraw enough benefits to force welfare
recipients into a moral lifestyle, including marriage and work in the mainstream
economy.305 Another camp despairs the government’s ability to change human
nature, proposing that only the individual who has accepted responsibility for his
own moral, social, and economic development is likely to become a moral person in
this sense.306 Proponents of this view might argue that privatizing the moral, social,
and economic world of the individual citizen is most likely to bring about real
change in the human condition, and excoriate any government response to human
need (emotional or physical) as incapable of providing for human well-being, except
for the “big” common needs such as security from external attack or
transportation/communications networks.
The Lutheran position does not understand the project of government to be lifechanging, in the sense that government can make “bad” individuals or cultures into
“good” if only it hits on the right programs.307 Nor, however, does the Lutheran
position accept the notion that the human condition is purely a private matter, and
that government has no role to play in recognizing and responding to the situations
of individual persons. From the Lutheran position, what the government can and
must recognize is human need (which it must alleviate) and human evil (which it
must resist).308 The legal metaphor which perhaps best describes Luther’s view about
the purpose of the law is the criminal “defense of others” metaphor, which permits
and even obliges a person to come to his neighbor’s defense, whether from physical

304

See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 28-31, 56-58 (1995).

305

Frank Block, et al. THE MEAN SEASON, 81-83, 85-88 (1987). This view can extend to
entire communities or culture as well, as evidenced by the debate on what should be done
about the “culture of poverty.” See, e.g., WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 112-35
(1971); KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 260-65 (1983).
306
See representation of this position as Charles Murray’s in BLOCK et al., supra note 310,
at 45, 115-16, 161-65.
307
However, Luther did believe that people’s conduct could be restrained by the law: See,
e.g., Lull, supra note 109, at 92. Braaten notes that “[t]here is among the orders no ideal
state. . . .Every structure of life must be examined as to whether it measures up to God’s
intention for it, whether in its current form it works for the common good in the service of
justice, liberty, and community.” Braaten supra note 71, at 35.
308

On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109 at 692-93.
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attack or from want, without regard for himself, even (justly) harming the
aggressor.309
The theological position of Lutheranism on recognition of human need is radical
in the preference of the other over the self, while not diminishing or refusing
recognition to the needs of the self.310 As one example of this radical preference for
the neighbor, when Luther is asked to recommend whether people should flee the
plague, abandoning their communities including those who cannot flee, Luther has
the same response to both the authorities and to those who are asking out of
relationship to individual persons. The governing authorities, those in public
office—to include mayors, judges and the like—are “under obligation to remain,” for
[t]o abandon an entire community which one has been called to govern . . . exposed
to all kinds of danger such as fires, murder, riots and every imaginable disaster is a
great sin.”311 However, even those who are not carrying on an official government
office must prefer the neighbor’s wellbeing: anyone who does not run the risk of
losing everything he holds dear in this life for the neighbor “but forsakes him and
leaves him to his misfortune becomes a murderer in the sight of God.”312
As the radicalness of that position is made possible by the theological claim that
God alone saves, a legal theorist in American culture might analogically resort to a
less radical claim—namely, that government intervention is rationally limited to the
resistance of human evil and the alleviation of the need of the neighbor. That is, one
need not accept the Lutheran position, or indeed any theology, to conclude that
neither government nor the individual human working on his own self-improvement
is likely to achieve a vast improvement in the human condition.
Such a position does not despair of human action, for human need and human
evil continue to impel both individuals as neighbors and as holders of government
office to act. It does require acceptance of the possibility that government can be
government both when it responds wrathfully to human evil, indifferent or
malicious; and when it responds in care, indeed sacrificially on behalf of the needy,
“for the betterment of the community.”

309

Luther, for instance, argued that “a Christian should be so disposed that he will suffer
every evil and injustice without avenging himself; neither will he seek legal redress in the
courts but have utterly no need of temporal authority and law for his own sake. On behalf of
others, however, he may and should seek vengeance, justice, protection, and help, and do as
much as he can to achieve it.” On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 675; see also
id. at 677. In fact, Luther suggested that if the governing authority failed a Christian, he
should suffer evil rather than avenge himself in the courts. Id. at 675.
310
See Braaten, supra note 71, at 37. Responding to the plague, Luther noted, “It is not
forbidden but rather commanded that . . . [we] avoid destruction and disaster whenever we
can, as long as we do so without detracting from our love and duty toward our neighbor. How
much more appropriate it is therefore to seek to preserve life and avoid death if this can be
done without harm to our neighbor. . . .” Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague, Lull,
supra note 109, at 740.
311

Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague, Lull, supra note 109, at 738.

312

Id. at 743.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In 1990, Carl Braaten noted why the Lutheran tradition holds promise for dealing
with the challenges of democratic pluralism. In this tradition, he writes, Christians
“have a double identity”:
[T]he God of the gospel is for them also the God of the law, at work in the
secular realm where the churched and the unchurched share a common
ground. This scheme allows that the rule of God in the public orders is
not primarily in the hands of believers but is communicated to all persons
through the natural orders and can be grasped through conscience and
moral reason.
There is for Lutheran Christians no secular world in which God is dead;
there is no empty world into which believers have to introduce the law of
God for the first time. God is at work through his ongoing creativity and
through the law that orders life in the world. . . .There is no sphere of life
where God is not active through the law that impinges on the human
conscience. . . .
. . . Lutherans believe that we experience God’s law as the driving force
behind the demands that human beings impose on each other as they live
in community. . . .
. . . The core of justice in all times and places is care for the neighbor.
The force required to administer justice through law is the “strange work”
of love (opus alienum) in public life.313
This paradoxical position, in which Christians are at once believers and members
of a world which does not recognize belief as a criterion for membership, is a
powerful alternative to exclusivist politics which recognize revelation and personal
conversion as a condition for moral good in the world. Yet, it is a position which
does not cast aside, privatize or subordinate the faith of the Christian believer to the
concerns of the world, or reduce the radical demands and promises of the Gospel to
moralisms or even a legal code. It does not reject or separate itself from the
fallenness of the world, nor does it confront the world as “other” than itself. Rather,
it confronts the demands of the neighbor for justice.
As I have suggested, the Lutheran position contains both a more realistic and yet
optimistic view of law-making than Justice Rehnquist’s judicial philosophy. It
recognizes at once the fallenness of all human beings and political institutions at
every level, while refusing to desist from those fallen persons in their need, refusing
to walk away from affirming criticism of those institutions that have served human
need with blindness, self-interest, and short-sightedness as well as creativity and
hope.
Unlike Justice Rehnquist, the Lutheran position rejects both objectivity and
relativism as ultimate ways of understanding the role of the orders, including judicial
review. It demands recognition of the role of the interpreter, the temptations to

313

Braaten, supra note 71, at 37.
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which she may succumb, and the way in which natural law must ultimately guide her
deliberations for the good of a diversity of citizens.
Yet, these kinds of arguments are precisely those which would make for a
judicial confirmation “religion-hunt” of the kind that the Catholic justices have
undergone. The evidence on Justice Rehnquist suggests, however, that such hunts
are likely to be fruitless, diverting the inquirer from more significant non-religious
influences on judicial philosophy, as both Justice Rehnquist’s story and Justice
Brennan’s confirmation suggest.314 It is perhaps unfortunately true that a
confirmation process focussing on denominational membership may be selfdefeating, failing to smoke out what a judge believes about the Constitution or his
own religion, while also being invidious—subjecting Catholics, Jews and other
outsider religions to “faith-tests” not demanded of Protestants.315 Indeed, the task of
asking Justices about their religious beliefs might impose peculiar moral taints upon
the confirmation process. As we review Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence, we must
either ask if he didn’t mean it when he suggested that his religious beliefs would
have nothing to do with his judicial decisions,316 or we must ask whether we have

314

Justice Brennan, as Levinson interprets, is a particularly good example of the shortsighted foolishness of denomination-typing. His “anti-Catholic” pledge apparently obviated
the need, in the minds of many senators, to ask him whether the other influences in his life—
his father’s union leadership and Brennan’s own judicial struggles with issues such as
gerrymandering as a judge—might not influence his jurisprudence. Goldman & Gallen, supra
note 138 5, 47 (1994). As a result, President Eisenhower ended up with a “bum steer” from a
conservative perspective—a Justice who predictably might be a liberal, looking at the other
influences in his life.
Moreover, such a “litmus test” may be self-defeating because it does not take seriously the
possibility that a Justice—of any faith-persuasion—may not understand his own theological
tradition. A judge’s or politician’s religious affiliation is at its best an informed creedal
commitment; at worst, conformity to cultural practices and beliefs of an only nominally
religious community or a way to rub elbows with a powerful elite necessary for an official’s
personal advancement. If the Senate does not call in a Catholic theologian to quiz Antonin
Scalia on his grasp and acceptance of Catholic doctrine, then it will be difficult for either a
Justice’s inquisitors or the Justice himself to recognize when his religious views are playing a
role.
Thus, a Senate that assumes that a Catholic will understand and apply Catholic theology
may find itself surprised to discover: a) that Catholics don’t believe what the Senate thought
they did, as Justice Brennan’s case points out; b) that Catholics don’t assume that their
Catholicism has much to do with their job, as Justice Scalia’s record points out; or c) that
Catholics may not know Catholic theology, and in fact be closet Protestants, Deists, or New
Agers.
315

See Levinson, supra note 14, at 1056-58.

316

Brennan reports that by the time of his confirmation hearings, he had settled that he had
a constitutional obligation “which could not be influenced by any of my religious principles.
As a Roman Catholic, I might do as a private citizen what a Roman Catholic does, and that is
one thing, but to the extent that that conflicts with what I think the Constitution means or
requires, then my religious beliefs have to give way.” Goldman & Gallen, supra note 134, at
16. While Levinson expresses doubt that the Catholic Justices ended up meaning what they
say, he also suggests that vibrant constitutionalism might counsel against forcing Catholic
justices (and other justices) into positivism as a way of ensuring that the religious and the
judicial never mix, id. at 1078-80.
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encouraged Justices to reconstruct that question so narrowly—i.e., in Brennan’s case,
as a crass Kennedyesque question about whether he would “take orders from the
Pope”—that they themselves will not realize when they have crossed the line from
“strict” judicial interpretation to moral or even religious argument.317
If we force religion underground, judges may easily mistake latent religious or
moral beliefs for public policy, creating real monsters of vagueness or
unpredictability, when they are not faced with a hard moral-formal choice, such as
the Coverian dilemma of choosing between a Fugitive Slave Act or human
freedom.318 As I have suggested, however, the more serious moral risk is that
Justices will faithfully KEEP their promises not to mix religious beliefs and
jurisprudential justifications. Although judges surely live in a sheltered world,319
perhaps the most important source of self-critique for a judge is his or her faith.
Despite caricatures of the mindless faithful, for a Justice coming from a mainline
Western religious tradition (as most have come) faith is an encounter with the uneasy
questions. It demands that a religious person ask himself or herself when he is
abandoning truth for convenience, when she is confusing the good with self-interest,
when she is confusing political pressure with community good. It is, of course, not
the only challenge to a Justice’s own limitations and self-delusions; there are the

317
Numerous statements suggest that Brennan at least instinctively employed natural law
understandings in his jurisprudence. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 734-35 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of this Court’s most important roles is . . . securing . . . the
legitimate expectations of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.”);
Goldman & Gallen, supra note 134, at 38 (quoting Justice Brennan’s Holmes lecture, “[L]aw,
when it merits the synonym justice, is based on reason and natural insight.”). In light of his
jurisprudence, that Justice Brennan demurred to the question suggests that he himself did not
know about the Catholic tradition of natural law, or did not assume that the natural law
tradition was “religious.” Levinson suggests as much. See supra note 15 at 1074.
318
Robert Cover described the moral-formal dilemma of anti-slavery judges conflicted
over their legal responsibility to administer the Fugitive Slave Law and their moral beliefs that
slavery was wrong. Robert Cover, JUSTICE ACCUSED 197-259 (1975).
319

Thus, justices will rarely be confronted about the validity of their longest-held private
beliefs; and have only the same one-way conversations with newspapers and television that
any of the rest of us has. Perhaps the most constant encounter with other-generational
thinking, for example, is from a judge’s clerks. Yet, many of them may be immediately out of
law school, where the headiness of pure legal argument for its own sake is largely
unencumbered by the tragedies and costs, humiliation and anger, the history and the
communities of the litigants, even after the most sensitive legal education. And Rehnquist
describes his own group of clerks as follows: “it would be all but impossible to assemble a
more hypercritical, not to say arrogant, audience than a group of law clerks criticizing an
opinion circulated by one of their employers.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT
37 (1987). According to Rehnquist, the clerks “like nothing better than to discuss and refine
abstract legal issues.” Id. at 48. Mark Tushnet has similarly noted the heavy influence of the
clerks. Mark Tushnet supra note 117 at 1327. Of course, the Justice has his/her colleagues, all
of whom live in roughly the same socioeconomic, professional, and geographical cocoon.
Although as Justice Rehnquist describes the Court’s review of cases, the influence of the
justices on each others’ first impressions seems minimal, since the culture encourages justices
to be “certain” and relatively final about their views on cases before they speak. Rehnquist,
supra note 114, at 290-95.
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conversations of the present and the past, with human beings and ideas. But faith, at
least in these particular traditions, is always a challenge.320
The major Western religions, at least, suggest that human beings are more likely
to be deluded from within than from without. If they are correct, then we have more
to fear from the Justice who keeps his promise to lock away his religion than from
the Justice who admits that it may influence him on occasion. For example, had
Justice Rehnquist felt himself permitted by his office to take the insights of his faith
into public life, one central concern of his jurisprudence—judges’ need for humility
before the democratic outcomes in a pluralistic moral culture—might have been
better worked out than through his clinging to any other ideology, whether
interpretive, political, or moral. He is perhaps a good “poster child” for a new
approach to the problem of religious values in judicial decision-making, an approach
which proceeds cautiously by analogy and with respect for its own limitations.

320
Perry also suggests that holding religious people to the standard of secular justification
or other external critiqe requires them to ask questions about their own interpretation of
tradition. RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 84-85.
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